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Abstract
In the context of a patent race, if innovation is sequential and there is no cross 
licensing, patents offer the patent owner monopoly control over his innovation, al­
lowing him to block all relative future R&D. Against this background, this thesis 
shows that patent protection can foster innovation because it offers the innovator 
an incentive to innovate. However, the monopoly that the patent holder enjoys can 
lead him to rest on his laurels, reducing his innovative effort and, at the same time, 
force some innovators to abstain from innovating, reducing knowledge spillovers. 
The above can lead to a humped shaped relationship between patent protection and 
output growth.
Bearing the above in mind, this thesis further engages in showing that in 
economies with restricted innovative capabilities a central planner may find it opti­
mal to offer limited patent protection compared to very innovative economies. In a 
similar fashion, a firm working on a new technological paradigm may find it opti­
mal to allow competitors to free ride on its technology, in order to benefit from the 
extended knowledge spillovers that its competitors will generate.
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Introduction
This thesis pursues the study of innovation within the context o f a patent race. Specif­
ically, chapter one is a literature review. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader 
to the economics o f intellectual property protection, with emphasis on patents. Bearing in 
mind that the economic arguments surrounding patents must be structured taking into con­
sideration the current legal framework, chapter one pays special attention at how the legal 
environment may shape the incentives to innovate, both on the national and international 
level, by means o f treaties such as the Paris convention and TRIPS. In addition, chapter one 
engages in clarifying any specialized terms that will henceforth find frequent use, such as 
the term patent breadth.
Chapter two, which is based on Panagopoulos (2003), contains a more I.O. based 
approach, compared to the macro modelling strategies that chapters three and four follow. 
In doing so, it concentrates on the question of optimal patent protection, the one that will 
maximize a firm’s profits. In this chapter, profits depend on technology, while technology 
depends on knowledge spillovers. In addition, knowledge spillovers depend on the ability 
of innovators/firms to reach an exogenous set target that is set by society. A good example 
for such a target is the goal to create a better AIDS treatment. The more capable a firm 
is of reaching this target the more useful its technology will be in terms of knowledge 
spillovers to other firms working on similar research. Bearing the above in mind, in the 
context o f a patent race in which many firms try to reach such an exogenously set target, 
a firm may find it optimal to allow competitors to free ride on its research, in the hope to
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benefit from enhanced knowledge spillovers that its competitors will collectively create. 
Such behavior is likely when the firm has developed a new technological paradigm that 
needs further development. This line o f thinking can account for the historical evidence 
on the development o f the transistor. It should be noted, that for the sake o f simplifying 
the argument, this chapter concentrates on cooperative solutions only. All the remaining 
chapters will also follow this approach. This intuition is in turn used to explain the lack 
o f research joint ventures (RJV) between universities and firms, noting that in the 1980s 
the US government took specific steps, in the form of an Act passed by the Congress (the 
Bayh-Dole Act) whose aim was to promote such ventures.
The argument introduced in chapter two suggests that firms who engage in research 
and development (R&D) on new technological paradigms (such as biotechnology, software 
and computer technology) are more likely to form an RJV with a university. The reason 
is that such firms optimally choose minimal intellectual property protection (lower prof­
its), in effect sharing their innovation, so as to benefit from increased knowledge spillovers. 
Thereby, the opportunity cost o f joining an RJV for firms (universities) working on ma­
ture (well developed) technologies is greater, making such partners unlikely candidates for 
RJVs. Empirical evidence offers support for such a result.
It should be noted that this chapter operates under the assumption that universities 
are not different from firms, both in the way they maximize profits, as well as in their 
research specialization. If  one is to make the more realistic assumption, as in Beath et al. 
(2003), that universities specialize on new technological paradigms, then the results o f this 
chapter are reinforced. Nonetheless, the question remains, how different are universities
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from firms in terms of their research? To this there is no definite answer. The Bayh Dole 
Act allowed universities to make greater use o f their patents. This Act has resulted in 
an increase in university patenting and a change in the way universities view patents.1 
However, evidence from Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) and Sampat, Mowery 
and Ziedonis (2003) indicate that there is no clear verdict out yet, on whether this Act 
has led to any significant changes on the quality of university research. On the other hand, 
there is a growing literature on technology incubators, science parks and university startups, 
showing that university research is closer to private research than before, and that this trend 
is likely to increase as time passes.2
Throughout this chapter, as well as in chapters 3 and 4, the results stem from a tour­
nament where each innovator has an exogenously given probability o f winning the tour­
nament. This exogeneity is one of the main drawbacks o f this thesis. Nevertheless, in the 
appendix o f chapter four I will suggest a way to endogenise this probability. This appen­
dix is structured around the assumptions of chapter four. However, it is straightforward to 
generalize this method and use it for chapters two and three. If one is to use this method, 
even though the results o f the thesis remain the same, the mathematical functions become 
cumbersome and most results rest on graphical interpretations. Another drawback that is 
common to both chapters two and four, is the exogenous introduction of a function that de­
termines the number of innovators who find it profitable to participate in the tournament. 
This function is important because it allows one to determine knowledge spillovers. Bear­
1 See Jensen, Thursby and Thursby (2003).
2 See Siegel, Westhead and Wright (2003), Wright, Vohora and Lockett (2004), and Audretsch, Lehman, 
and Warning (2004).
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ing the above in mind, chapter four introduces some intuition that is based on financial 
economics, which allows one to determine through a simulation the number o f innovators 
who take part in the tournament.
Chapter three shifts the attention away from the patent protection that maximizes 
profits to concentrate on the one that maximizes production. Specifically, working under 
the assumption that two firms participate in a tournament, where only the winner will be 
able to embody his innovation into the final product, this chapter aims at finding the patent 
protection that will allow a central planner to maximize production. Innovation in this 
chapter is assumed to be a twofold process, which rests on prior art and risk taking exper­
imentation, and it is up to the firm to find the optimal combination between the two. To 
provide a present day analogue of this twofold process, as suggested by John Beath, one 
can think of this relationship as describing the ability of the NHS to provide medical treat­
ment. Specifically, the NHS employs, in broad terms, two categories o f workers, medical 
staff (nurses and doctors) and researchers. Medical staff functions as prior art (in the sense 
that they encompass what we already know in treating diseases), while researchers present 
us with new and yet untested techniques that may lead to breakthroughs as well as pitfalls. 
Accounting for the above, one can think of this framework as one that deals with how to 
best split medical and research staff in such a way that will increase the NHSs ability to 
offer medical services.
The main argument of this chapter is that the monopoly that patents offer can lead 
the innovator to rest on his laurels, diminishing any incentives to innovate. There is a well 
known historic precedent that displays how lack o f competition can lead an innovator to
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rest on his laurels. Specifically, in the 1890s Edison successfully patented his light-bulb 
filament invention; however, until the patent expired, General Electric did not improve 
this technology. In addition, even though other companies had created a better light bulb, 
General Electric managed (through successful litigation) to keep competitors out o f the 
market, increasing its market share and sales.
Based on the above, chapter three shows that there is a positive relationship between 
patent strength and the ability of the firm (economy) to experiment/innovate. This implies 
that economies that have the ability to successfully experiment/innovate may find it optimal 
to have stronger patent protection compared to economies that are not capable o f success­
fully doing so. Hence, on the international level, patent protection should not be uniform. 
Instead it should vary depending on the economy’s ability to innovate. This line of thinking 
runs counter to the one-policy-fits-all argument propagated by the TRIPS agreement.
The last chapter revisits the main issues discussed in chapters two and three, intro­
ducing them in one unified, albeit simplified, endogenous growth framework. Specifically, 
while accounting for the view that patents reward the innovator, acting as stimuli, this chap­
ter also concentrates on two additional ways through which stronger patent protection can 
affect innovation. The first one, as in chapter three, is based on the idea that the more 
one feels a competitor’s breath behind his back the more he is forced to run. This idea, 
which goes back to Beath, Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989), as well as Harris and Vickers 
(1987), implies that a decrease in patent protection should increase competition for the 
most successful technology (as all innovators will be able to freely copy the latest inno­
Introduction 6
vation) forcing competitors on adopting risky innovation strategies. Such strategies can 
potentially lead to breakthroughs as well as failures.
The second way is examined by looking at knowledge spillovers, as in chapter two. 
Specifically, an increase in patent protection makes it harder for other innovators to by­
pass a patent. Lemer (1995), working on biotechnology firms, finds that this difficulty may 
force some innovators to abstain from innovating in this particular sector. Such a reduc­
tion in innovative effort may lead to a drop in knowledge spillovers, negatively affecting 
innovation.
Similar to chapter three, chapter four will be based on a tournament, where many 
heterogeneous innovators participate, the winner o f which will be the only innovator to use 
his technology in production. Technology in this framework will depend on knowledge 
spillovers, prior art, research workers and luck. Simulating the model, in order to derive 
the patent strength that maximizes output growth, a humped-shaped relationship between 
patent protection and output growth is derived. This shape accords with recent empirical 
findings by Lemer (2004).
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Chapter 1 
Litterae Patentae an Age Old Institution in the 
Modern Era
1.1 Introduction
When Yale professor Daniel J. Kevles presented his report on the ‘History o f  Patenting 
Life’ to the European Group of Ethics in Science and New Technologies,3 he was in effect 
describing one o f the newest chapters on intellectual property. At the center of his attention 
was the Chakrabarty case, involving the genetic modification o f a pseudomonas bacterium. 
By all measures, this was one of the most important patent cases ever taken to the US 
Supreme Court, and its success opened the way to the controversial biotechnology patents. 
Undoubtedly, patents have evolved quite a long way from being simple Litterae Patentae 
(open letters), through which 17th century British monarchs would grand a reward, in the 
form of a monopoly, to innovators as well as to various forms o f commercial endeavor, 
such as cotton mills. In our day they are not simple rewards, they are means that, with good 
usage, can lead to further innovation, as well as to problems that in many cases may have 
been unanticipated by law makers. The ethical issue created by life patents is a simple and 
popular example.
The aim o f this chapter is to offer a review of the economics o f patents. To this effect, 
I will offer a short historic account of the patent system, plus an introduction to the legal
3 See Kevles (2002).
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requirements and justifications of patent law. In addition, I will elaborate on the best ways 
to design a patent, and more importantly, I will provide statistics that aim at manifesting 
the degree o f importance o f patents during the last 20 years. It is the latter attribute of this 
review that mostly differentiates it from Gallini and Scotchmer (2001), and Gallini (2002), 
which revisit the question of whether patents are the best way to reward innovation.4
Since this chapter concentrates on the economics o f patents, the legal, sociological 
and philosophical literature will only sporadically appear in the following pages. Further­
more, the managerial literature will not be accounted for at all. This literature mostly 
concentrates on prescribing remedies to practitioners on how to navigate the patent system 
best, and on how to improve on their business practices by using patents. Therefore, by 
reviewing it one will be shifting the center o f attention from theory to practice and from 
patent design to business practice.
This chapter is structured in the following way: I begin by looking at the emergence 
o f the international patent system, in section two. Then, the following section introduces 
a short discussion on alternative means of rewarding innovativeness. The focus of section 
four will be on the advantages and disadvantages o f the patent system. The final subsection 
o f section four will elaborate on patent litigation, which is considered by many to be a 
major malady in an otherwise well functioning system. Section five revisits a question that 
has been at the heart of academic debate in the last fifteen years, concerning the optimal 
design o f patent system, to be finally followed by the conclusions.
4 For a literature review one could also look at Langinier and Moschini (2002).
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1.2 A description of the patent system
The patent system is justified on the basis of providing incentives to innovation. However, 
providing motives for innovators is far from a modem concept. Incentives in various forms 
were practiced throughout the ancient world.5 Nevertheless, it seems that protecting one’s 
innovation from imitators was merely a matter o f secrecy and tacit knowledge.6 One first 
encounters the main characteristics of a patent system in the 13th century, when Germanic 
rulers in the Tyrolean region granted awards for mining discoveries, see Kaufer (1989). 
However, the credits for codifying the first patent law go to Venice, back in 1474, where 
the first patent law was codified. In later years this code was to form the basis for both the 
French and the British patent systems.7
In modem times patents are issued by patent offices, which examine a set o f legal 
requirements such as novelty, non-obviousness and industrial applicability (in Europe), as 
well as usefulness (in the USA). If one is to look at a patent application, it has two main 
parts. The first one is a specification o f the invention. This part is written like a science 
article describing the problem and the steps taken to solve it. The second part consists 
of a set of claims. These claims define what the innovator considers to be the breadth o f 
the invention, the technological territory claimed for control through the right to sue for 
infringement.
5 To offer a well-cited example, the Archimedean buoyancy principle (the one that caused Archimedes’s 
legendary Eureka phrase) was motivated by an award offered by the Governor o f  Syracuse.
6 In many cases innovators did not seek protection at all. Many famous discoveries, such as the Pythagorean 
principle and the Archimedean buoyancy principle fall under this category.
7 For a complete historic account of the patent system from the middle ages to present, see Epstein, Laurie 
and Elder (1992) and Wegner (1993).
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However, even today national laws and courts’ jurisprudence vary considerably in 
the way they treat patents. This difference is further exaggerated in the treatment that 
foreign patents frequently receive. Such changes have created a need for harmonization 
of different patent systems and practices. This need first became apparent in the late 19th 
century and was to increase further in the 20th century, because more and more innovations 
found transnational applications, creating the need to protect foreign innovators.
Aiming to accommodate this need, the Paris convention was signed in 1883. It pro­
vided that each o f the signatory countries would treat domestic and international patentees 
equally. The next major step was taken in 1984, under the auspices of the World Intel­
lectual Property Organization (WIPO). This agreement, which came into being in 1990, 
introduced a centralized patent procedure.8 WIPO was but a small step to patent harmo­
nization, because many countries, including the US, failed to sign it. Nevertheless many of 
its provisions were later incorporated into the GATT agreement, through the Trade Related 
Aspects o f Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS), which was signed in 1993 by 100 na­
tions. TRIPS established minimum standards for patent protection (e.g. an award period o f 
at least 18 years) and enforced equal rights between domestic and foreign patentees.9
In respect to Europe, the European Patent Convention (EPC) was signed in 1978, 
establishing the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO discloses applications after 18
8 The applicant had to file for a patent in his native land, in his native language, plus a later English trans­
lation o f the application.
9 TRIPS has been the center o f criticism. For example, the theoretical literature, working on North v. South 
models o f trade has cast doubts on weather TRIPS will succeed in fulfilling its main promise, which was to 
promote innovations (by introducing a tangible patent system) to third world countries, see, Deardorff (1991), 
Diwan and Rodrik (1989), Helpman (1993) and Lai (2001). Empirical doubts are also cast by, Lanjouw (1998 
a), Lanjouw and Cockbum (2000). By contrast, Sherwood (1997) takes a far more positive approach towards 
TRIPS.
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months, and the awards last for 20 years. Recognizing that the formation of the EPO 
was just a step towards a common goal (in the form of a unified and centralized patent 
system) EEC members agreed on the Convention for the European Patent for the Common 
Market, which was first agreed in 1975, amended in 1985 and 1989, but is yet to be fully 
implemented.10
Contrary to European patent systems the Japanese one is relatively recent. Specif­
ically, in Japan patent law was first introduced in the Meiji era and many of its elements 
were modeled upon the German system.11 After WWII, it was amended to incorporate a 
weaker novelty requirement and disclosure after 18 months. The JPO, up until 1988, is­
sued very narrow patents, typically with only one claim and, since the judges frequently 
exerted pressure for settlements, patent litigation was lengthier than in Europe and the US. 
Due to US pressure, in 1989 Japan initiated the Structural Impediments Initiative, which 
led Japan (in 1994) to allow foreign applicants: to file patent application in English, to re­
quest accelerated patent examinations, and to stop threatening firms that refused to license 
their patents to rivals.12
The US case needs special attention, not only because it is the country where most 
of the latest innovations originate from, but because it has been the stage o f recent drastic 
changes in patent practice, changes that are finding their way to other patent systems as
10 It calls for a centrally enforceable patent and a centralized appellate court. In 2003 it was decided that 
the court should be based in Luxemburg but that it should assemble in the country where the case originated. 
Even though this provision was supposed to start from the year 2010, it has already been slowed down by 
more objections from member states that view this agreement as cumbersome.
11 See Forstner (1993).
12 For a closer look at the empirical evidence concerning the Japanese patent reform see Sakakibara and 
Branstetter (2001).
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well. In addition, the US is the only country where patent protection is constitutionally 
founded, being based on an exclusive rights clause (Article 1.8).13
Overall, some of the main changes that took place in the last 20 years are the follow­
ing:
a) in 1980 Congress passed the Patent and Trademark Laws Amendment (Bayh- 
Dole); this Act allowed universities to patent any innovations they had created with gov­
ernment funding.14
b) In 1980 the US Supreme Court extended patentability to genetically engineered 
bacteria (Diamond v. Chakrabarty).
c) In 1981 the Supreme Court held that software that was part of a manufacturing 
system or process was patentable (Diamond v. Diehr).
d) In 1982 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvements Act. This Act allowed 
for the formation of a centralized appellate court, the Court o f Appeals of the Federal Cir­
cuit (CAFC). As I will elaborate in a later section, the CAFC has been applauded by many 
on taking a tougher stance on patent infringement, basing its decisions (in addition to the 
traditional criteria o f novelty, utility and non-obviousness) on market success considera­
tions as well.15
13 For a criticism o f Article 1.8 see Kingston (2003).
14 For an in depth analysis on university patenting and the effects o f  the Bayh Dole Act see, Henderson, Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, (1998), Beath et al. (2003), Sampat, Mowery and Ziedonis (2003), and Poyago-Theotoky, 
Beath and Siegel (2002).
15 The CAFC, when examining a patent infringement case, bases its decision on the following legal doc­
trines, a) the doctrine of disclosure and enablement: under the law disclosure must be sufficient to enable 
‘any person skilled in the art to make and use’ the claimed invention (U.S. Code, 1988, Section 112). b) The 
doctrine o f equivalents: The doctrine of equivalents states that ‘[I]f two devices do the same work in substan­
tially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ 
in name, form, or shape’ , (Supreme Court decision Graver Tank, 1950, at 668). c) The doctrine o f reverse 
equivalents: this doctrine is fit for cases where, even though a devise fits under the claims of the litigant, it is
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e) In 1984 Congress passed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, to protect mi­
crochip design.16
f) In 1998 the CAFC upheld a patent on a software system that performs real-time 
accounting calculations and reporting, which was to be used by mutual fund companies 
(State Street Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group). This decision allowed 
the patentability of business methods.
To the above one should also add the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration 
Act (Hatch-Waxman Act),17 and The First American Inventors Protection Act o f 1999.18
In order to put the above description of the patent system into perspective, in the 
rest o f this section I will provide some descriptive statistics that shade some light on who 
patents what. On this, the study of Allison and Lemley (2002) is invaluable, not only 
because it offers a comprehensive study of 1000 utility patents issued in the US during 
1996-1998, but also because it points out the differences between technological sectors, 
noting an overwhelming increase in the number of issued patents. Specifically, in the period 
under study, the patent office issued 147520 patents, a 45.4% increase over the number 
issued just three years earlier.
so advanced that it should be excused. For further details, see Merges and Nelson (1994).
16 In the process Congress created a new form o f intellectual property rights, ‘masked rights’, for microchip 
designs. Accordingly, in order for a chip to qualify for masked rights it needs to display a degree o f originality 
that is substantially lower compared to patents, see Hunt (1999 b).
17 This Act restores up to 5 years of lost patent time spend on FDA testing. It also formally eliminates 
duplicative testing of generic drugs. Moreover, the first firm to file an application for making a generic 
equivalent to a branded drug receives a 180-day period o f exclusivity, while manufacturers o f branded drugs 
are allowed to request a 30-month postponement o f the FDAs approval o f generic drugs.
18 This Act requires that all patent applications filed in the US and abroad be laid for public inspection 18 
months from the earlier domestic or foreign filling date. Moreover, the Act establishes prior use defense 
against patent infringement charges for anyone who had reduced the subject matter to practice at least one 
year before the patent filing date and commercially used it prior to the filling date.
1.2 A description of the patent system 16
a) On average, each patent in this sample lists 2.26 inventors. From these patents 
851/1000 patents assigned their rights to a corporate entity and 707/1000 patents were 
assigned to large entities. O f the 293 patents that were assigned to small entities, 118 were 
organizations (11 non-profits organizations and 197 small businesses), while individuals 
prosecuted the remaining 175 patents.
b) If one is to examine the size o f patent applicants by technology area, most patent 
applications were filed by big firms. For example, out of 76 software patents, 5 were by 
individuals, 3 by small business, 2 by non-profits, 10 by small enterprises and 66 by large 
enterprises.
c) On average, these patents spent 2.77 years in prosecution, from the filing o f the 
first US application to the issue date. The range of prosecution varied widely from a low 
of 1.16 years to 18.15 years. In all, prosecution time has increased, bearing in mind that 
Allison and Lemley (1998) found a mean of 2.37 years.
d) Taking a closer look per technology sector, software spends on average 3.15 years 
in prosecution, pharmaceuticals 4.46 and biotechnology 4.72. Overall, patents in the areas 
o f chemistry, pharmaceuticals, software and biotechnology took significantly longer than 
average to make it through the PTO.
e) Each patent made reference to an average o f 15.16 total pieces o f prior art, the 
minimum being zero and the maximum number o f references being 163. On average, each 
patent cited 10.34 prior US patents, compared with only 2.44 foreign patents and 2.37 
non-patent references.
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f) On average, patents in the sample had 14.87 claims, some patents had as few as 
one claim and as many as 120.
Concentrating on software patents only, Bessen and Hunt (2004) draw similar con­
clusions and show that there has been an overwhelming increase in the number o f patents. 
In addition, contrary to expectations, the software industry is not the principal holder o f 
these patents.19 More macro statistics can be found in Jaffe (2000), who provides data on, 
patent ratios over time, US patent and R&D trends, patents from publicly funded research, 
publicly funded patents per dollar of research expenditure, biotechnology and software 
patents.
1.3 Patents and alternatives means for rewarding 
innovativeness
Patents are thought to be conducive to innovation as, by means of granting a state monopoly 
for a limited time, innovators can secure a return to his investment. The argument that com­
petitive markets may not be beneficial to innovation has been familiar since at least the time 
of J. S. Mill20 and was restated in the framework of the modem theory o f market failure by
19 In detail, 20000 software patents are now granted each year, compromising over 15% of all patents. The 
growth in software patents accounts for over 2% of the total growth in the number o f patents between 1976 
and 2001. Furthermore, compared to other technology sectors, software patents are more likely to be assigned 
to firms than individuals, especially larger US firms. They are also more likely to have US investors and they 
receive more citations from subsequent patents. Software patents are assigned to firms in a wide variety o f  
industries. Most are assigned to manufacturing firms and relatively few are actually assigned to firms in the 
software publishing industry. This pattern conflicts with the simple view that firms are equally likely to obtain 
software patents to protect individual software inventions. BEA analysis o f software investment (see Parker 
and Grimm (2000)) implies that about 30% of software is produced as package software, the primary product 
o f firms in SIC 7372. Yet the software publishing industry acquires a much smaller portion o f software 
patents.
20 See Mill (1848).
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Arrow (1962). Arrow (1962) was the first to suggest that competitive markets perhaps may
not be beneficial to innovation. As Gallini and Scotchmer (2001) note, ‘An invention is
a combination o f  tangible embodiments and an intangible idea  Typically, both the
information and the tangible embodiments are costly to the inventor, but only the tangible 
components are costly to the rival. ’ Therefore, some protection is needed for the innovator, 
for without any protection the rival will be able to appropriate in full the innovation dis­
couraging any research. This latter rationale has been questioned by Boldrin and Levine 
(2002), who in a stylized framework, where preferences remain constant, argue that innov­
ative incentives can be sufficient even under a competitive environment, i.e. no or minimal 
protection. Their argument is centered on the assumption that the innovator will be able to 
charge a price for the initial copy of the product (which can then be freely reproduced at 
will) that covers his R&D cost. Hence, the monopoly that patents offer is far from a sine 
qua non.
As Abramowicz (2003) argues, many different methods of reward have been used 
in the past. One could note prizes21 and grants. In recent days for example, the World 
Health Organization and the World Bank have suggested prizes for developing vaccines 
that mostly affect underdeveloped countries, and thus are not a top priority for pharmaceu­
tical corporations. However, as Kremer (2001) suggests, there is a considerable amount 
o f moral hazard and adverse selection involved in prizes and grants making such systems 
cumbersome to operate.
21 To offer a historic example, in the 18th century the British government offered a prize for the most accurate 
method to calculate a ship’s longitude at sea. John Harrison claimed the prize, after decades o f delay.
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By contrast, patents, being impersonal and resting on clear-cut criteria (novelty, util­
ity and non-obviousness), do not carry such a risk. Nevertheless, patents create monopo­
lies. Therefore, they create a dead weight loss to society. In addition, as Tabarrok (2002) 
explains, even though patents are needed for firms to recoup their R&D sunk costs, yet 
patents are not awarded on the basis o f a firm’s sunk costs. Because of the above deficien­
cies there have been many suggestions on how to create a better (or an alternative) patent 
system. For example, Kremer (1998) argues in favor o f an auction, where the patent au­
thorities take possession of the patent, auctioning it to the highest bidder. Assuming that 
firms can observe the true value o f the patent, firms reveal this value in the course of the 
auction.
There have also been other less radical suggestions. For example, Aoki and Spiegel 
(1999) argue for an earlier disclosure of patent applications in order to facilitate a faster 
exchange of technology. Gilbert and Katz (2003) make a case for patents that allow for less 
claims, while Hunt (1999 a) concentrates on nonobviousness, suggesting that the recent 
trend (to decrease nonobviousness) can lead to less R&D activity. As he argues, this is 
more likely to occur in industries that rapidly innovate. Lastly, some researchers including 
Warren-Boulton, Baseman and Woroch (1994) and Cole (2001) are in favor of copyrights 
instead of patents for fast evolving industries such as software.
All the above views are centered on the way patents are awarded. Nevertheless, there 
have also been suggestions on how to promote R&D without changing the current system. 
The idea is to administer patents better, say through patent pools. An example may be the 
patent pool for DVD and MPEG patents; see Lemer, Strojwas and Tirole (2003) and Lemer
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and Tirole (2003). Needless to say, as Kultti, Takalo and Toikka (2002) argue, that the old 
debate on patents v. trade secrets is still on.22 23
1.4 Do patents stimulate innovation?
On the basis o f the criticism addressed in the previous section, the aim here is to examine 
whether patents act as a stimulant to innovation. As I will show, even though patents are far 
from being a panacea, in general they act as an incentive to innovate. However, their effect 
is sector specific. This section will elaborate on this by first concentrating on arguments 
that focus on how patents can stagnate innovation, and then look at arguments that find 
patents valuable. To this end, I will first focus on the empirical research that was carried 
out using patent counts and patent renewals,24 and then discuss the findings o f survey-based 
research. In the last part of this section I will pay attention to one of the main disutilities 
that are frequently associated with patents, i.e. patent litigation. As I hope to exhibit, the 
large cost associated with litigation can act as a barrier to innovation. Unfortunately, this 
last section will abstain from a much-needed theoretical coverage o f patent litigation. Such 
an inclusion would drift this discussion too far into the territory o f law. Nevertheless, the 
interested reader can find an introduction to US patent law in Besen and Raskind (1991), 
while Bentley and Sherman (2001) provide a thorough treatment o f UK patent law. In 
addition, from an economist’s perspective, the question o f ‘licensing v. litigation'' (which
22 See also Denicolo and Franzoni (2002).
23 For an excellent introduction to trade secrets and trade secret law see Friedman Landes and Posner (1991).
24 For a detailed analysis o f the methods and techniques used see Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam (1996).
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is always at the centre o f any patent litigation case) is examined by Aoki and Hu (1998) 
and Crampes and Langinier (2001).
1.4.1 Do patents deter innovation?
A model o f patent protection applied to a single, isolated invention postulates that stronger 
patents will induce more R&D investment; see Nordhaus (1969). There is no doubt that this 
model is a useful starting point, but it does not accurately depict many innovation processes. 
For example, if  one is to look at some modem areas of research, say biotechnology, an in­
teresting pattern emerges where some firms may control key research (and production) 
technologies, causing the research of other equally innovative firms to stagnate. Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) have coined this effect the ‘tragedy o f  the anticommons ’. Specifically, us­
ing the ‘tragedy o f  the commons' metaphor, which explains how people can overuse shared 
resources, they argue that in certain key technologies we are now faced with the opposite 
problem. People underuse scarce resources because too many owners can block each other. 
In other terms, stronger intellectual property rights may lead to fewer useful products for 
improving human health. Their argument finds support by Harrington (2002). He suggests 
that, since gene patents are awarded upstream in the innovative process, often long be­
fore a marketable downstream product is available, granting gene patents may promote the 
discovery of genes, but stifle any further research by effectively discouraging institutions 
other than the patent holder from thoroughly studying the gene. Lemer (1994), working on 
a sample o f biotechnology firms, finds evidence of such behavior, where firms choose to
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redirect their innovative effort to technological areas in which prior art is not under strict 
patent control by rivals.
However, even if patent control is strict there is always an incentive to bypass the 
patent by inventing around it. Needless to say that in this case the ongoing duplication may 
not be welfare enhancing. To this end, as Gallini (1992) argues, extending patent life may 
increase an entrant’s incentives to introduce an imitation during the patent period. There­
fore, it may not much increase the value o f a patent or, by the same token, the incentives 
to research. Even if inventions can be copied only after their patents expire, incentives to 
innovate may decline with increases in patent life. As Horowitz and Lai (1996) suggest, as­
suming that the inventor can develop higher quality improvements over time, then the rela­
tionship between the rate of innovation and the length of a patent will have an 'inverted-U’ 
shape. The mechanism behind this is the following: while an increase in patent life induces 
the researcher to develop larger inventions, inventions occur less frequently. Subsequently, 
for sufficiently long patents, the frequency effect dominates the size effect. As a result, the 
rate of innovation declines for increases in patent life.25 26
Evidence of an ‘inverted-U’ shape have been found by Lemer (2004). To be precise, 
Lemer conducts an international analysis of the relationship between patent strength and 
innovation, examining 177 policy shifts in 60 countries over 150 years. Lemer uses the fol­
25 The result that further extensions in initially long patent lives may reduce overall incentives to research 
may also hold if subsequent researchers, other than the pioneer, are capable o f developing the improved, 
patentable technologies, see Koo and Wright (2001).
26 The model o f Horowitz and Lai is one o f the few models that directly examine the effects o f patent 
protection on economic growth. Similar exceptions include, Kwan and Lai (2000), who use an endogenous 
growth model a la Romer (1990) in order to show that intellectual property protection in the US may well 
be too weak rather than strong, and Gould and Gruben (1996), who find evidence that intellectual property 
protection is a significant determinant of economic growth.
1.4 Do patents stimulate innovation? 23
lowing four features in order to determine patent strength: a) whether protection existed in 
whole or in part for important technologies; b) the duration o f the patent; c) the patent fee; 
and d) the existence of various limitations on patent awards (such as compulsory licensing). 
In this analysis the dependent variable was the growth o f patent applications by residents 
in the country, while the independent variables include a dummy variable on whether the 
policy change is protection enhancing or reducing, and a dummy variable for the strength 
of protection prior to the change. Accounting for the above, Lemer finds some support 
for an ‘inverted-W  relationship between patent strength and innovation. This implies that, 
strengthening patent protection has a positive effect on innovation if protection is initially 
low and a negative impact if patent protection is initially high.
In addition to the above, nonobviousness has been one o f the main sources of criti­
cism against the patent system. Anecdotal evidence o f patents that claim what everybody 
seems to already know is too numerous to account.27 In theory, a patent must contain mat­
ter that is not obvious to anyone skilled in the prior art. However, as Jaffe (2000), Merges
(1999) and Kesan (2002) argue, this rule seems to have been relaxed for some subject mat­
ter. Such a reduction in nonobviousness seems to be particularly true for software: see 
Hunt (2001), who questions the quality of many patent awards, observing that bad patents 
can block worthwhile innovation. As Judge Markey notes (Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys­
tems, Inc. 757 F2d 1266 Federal Circuit 1993), ‘A patent is born valid and remains valid 
until a challenger proves it was stillborn or had birth defects ’; therefore it is up to the in­
novator, through litigation, to prove the merits of his innovation, while arguing that the
27 There even exist newsletters that bring such patents to the attention o f the interested reader, see: 
patnews@ns 1 .patenting-art.com.
1.4 Do patents stimulate innovation? 24
blocking patent should not have been issued. As I will elaborate in a later subsection, lit­
igation is a rather costly way to rectify the mistakes made by the patent office. To this 
reduction in nonobviousness one should also add the already noted increase in delays dur­
ing patent prosecution by the patent office. It suffices to say that such delays can be costly 
for industries where technologies evolve at a fast rate, rending them obsolete very quickly.
Bessen and Hunt (2004) suggest that, for software, the patent system can even lead 
to a reduction in R&D, even though the number of patents increases. Specifically, using 
the software share o f a firm’s patents as a proxy for the cost o f patenting, they find that 
software patents do substitute for R&D. Specifically, those firms that increased the share 
of software patents in their patent portfolios tended to reduce their R&D spending relative 
to sales in the 1990s. The magnitude of the substitution effect is significant. For example, 
at sample means, firms would have to spend 10% more on R&D if  patenting standards 
had not been changed for software. Bessen and Hunt argue that these results point to an 
economically important reason why firms acquired software patents in the 1990s, namely 
a patent thicket strategy. Such a strategy concentrates on building a strong patent portfolio, 
one that will prove hard to bypass for any rival. Such a portfolio can act as a significant 
source of revenue, but above all it acts as a defense against similar portfolios.
Furthermore, as Bessen and Hunt note, prior to 1999 software patents tended to cost 
more than other patents; however, as they find, after 1990 software patents cost less that 
other patents and they are associated with proportionately larger patent portfolios for any 
given level o f profits. In other words, changes in the cost o f patenting software largely 
explain the recent widespread use of patents. This explanation for the recent surge in patent
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applications contrasts Kortum and Lemer (1997), who, by process o f elimination, conclude 
that, even though the explanation behind the recent patent surge lies (as in Bessen ad Hunt) 
outside the patent system, this surge can be explained by an increase in the productivity of 
research.
1.4.2 Do patents promote innovation?
Turning my attention to the positive attributes of patents it is perhaps worthwhile to ini­
tially concentrate on whether patents act as a research promotion mechanism, i.e. a subsidy 
to R&D. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) using patent data from the UK, France and Ger­
many find that at the aggregate level patent protection is a relatively small component of 
the incentive structure underlying private R&D investments. However, the distribution of 
the private value of patent rights is sharply skewed. There is a concentration of patent 
rights with very little private economic value, but the tail o f the distribution contains highly 
valuable patent rights. In later research on patent renewal data from France, Schankerman 
(1998) finds that patent protection is a significant, but not the major, source o f private re­
turns to inventive activity and that its importance varies sharply across technology fields. 
To provide an example, even though on average patents are equivalent to a 15% subsidy on 
R&D these figures are 15-20% for mechanics and electronics.28 Along these lines, Lanjouw 
(1993), using West German patent data, suggests that for her sample, learning is complete 
within 6 years, obsolescence is rapid, and the distribution of patent value is very skewed. 
To this line of research one should also add Lemer (1994). Specifically, Lemer, using a
28 For similar results see Lanjouw (1998 b).
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sample of 535 financing rounds at 173 privately held venture-backed biotechnology firms, 
develops a proxy for patent breadth based on the international patent classification scheme 
and shows that the breadth of patent protection significantly affects valuations.
Turning my attention to survey based research, one of the oldest studies carried out 
on the value o f patents was by Mansfield et al. (1982), who surveyed 48 (patented and 
unpatented) product innovations of major US firms in the chemicals, drug, electronics, 
machinery industry. As it turned out, 60 % of patented innovations were imitated within 
four years o f introduction. Nevertheless, this obsolescence seems to be sector dependant. 
This is also illustrated by Mansfield (1986), who asked the R&D executives o f 1000 US 
manufacturing firms to identify the fraction of inventions developed by their firms that they 
would have chosen to develop had they been unable to patent. For electrical equipment, 
primary metals, instruments, office equipment, motor vehicles, and several other industries, 
these executives considered patents to be less important than a head start, and accordingly 
they would have proceeded with 90% of their innovations. One reason frequently quoted 
for this is that for new, rapidly changing technologies, patent information is largely outdated 
by the time it is granted (see Cohen Nelson and Walsh (1998)). This picture changes if one 
is to look at pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals. Executives in the pharmaceutical industry 
reported that without patent protection 60% of their new pharmaceuticals would not have 
been developed, and the reduction in other chemicals would have been about 40%.
In a seminal contribution, Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) concentrate 
on how patents can increase production cost for imitators. They show that patents tend to 
raise imitation cost and time, and that these increases can be regarded as alternative indica­
1.4 Do patents stimulate innovation? 27
tors o f the relative effectiveness o f patents in different industries. Again there seems to be a 
lot of variation across industries. For example, patents raise imitation cost by 40 percentage 
points for both major and typically new drugs, by 30 points for major new chemical prod­
ucts, and by 25 points for typical chemical products. These figures are in accordance with 
an earlier study by Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981), which concluded that patents 
generally raised imitation cost by 30 percentage points in drugs, 20 points in chemicals and 
7 points in electronics.
Protection is at the centre of a similar study by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000), 
who turn their attention to the ways firms use to protect their intellectual property. Their 
principal finding is that although patents may have increased in importance among firms, 
they are still not one of the major mechanisms in most industries. Nevertheless, patents can 
act as a barrier to rivals. Specifically, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh observe that in addition 
to preventing imitation the most prominent motives for patenting include the prevention of 
rivals from patenting related inventions (i.e. patent blocking), the use of patents in negotia­
tions and the prevention of suits. This latter view is supported by Hall and Ziedonis’s work 
on the semiconductor’s industry; see Hall and Ziedonis (2001).
It would perhaps be educational to elaborate on the methods and techniques usually 
used to achieve such protection. One method that is frequently observed, particularly in 
chemicals (apart from drugs) and other discrete product industries, is the combination of 
patents in order to build patent fences around some patented core invention. Such ‘barri­
cading' involves the patenting (though not the licensing) o f variants and other inventions 
that may substitute for the principal innovation in the hope to preempt rivals from introduc­
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ing competing innovations. For example, in the 1940’s DuPont patented over 200 substi­
tutes for Nylon to protect its core invention, Hounsel and Smith (1988).29 30
A second ‘similar’ use of patents is observed in complex industries such as elec­
tronics, where in order to become (or remain) a major competitor, firms often amass large 
portfolios.31 The fact that, in such industries, the same patents are often used for both block­
ing and negotiations, suggests that firms not only patent to protect their own technology, 
but to hold their rivals hostage by controlling technology that they need. For an in depth 
analysis o f such patent thicket strategies, see Shapiro (2001).
To the amassing of patent portfolios for protection one must also add a new trend, 
one that became evident in the 1990’s, where companies use their patent portfolios in a 
predatory fashion. For example, several companies, including Texas Instruments, Intel, 
and Wang Laboratories approach rivals demanding royalties on old patent awards. For 
instance, in 1991 Texas Instruments is estimated to have received 257$ million from patent 
licenses and settlements because of its general counsel’s aggressive enforcement policy; 
see Rosen (1992).
Protecting one’s intellectual property
The threat of patent litigation is by far not a new strategy (see Khan (1995) for a 
historical account) and in many cases firms end up in court over alleged infringement. It is
29 Turner (1998) documents the case o f the Fan patent where DuPont patented an improvement on its al­
ready commercialized color proofing process for photographic film in order to prevent its preemption in the 
marketplace.
30 Arora (1997) descries how chemical firms will sometimes protect an innovation by applying for one or 
more patents on different elements of an innovation, while keeping other elements secret.
31 Therefore, it is o f no surprise that o f the ten firms receiving the most patents in 1998, nine are in the 
electronics industries.
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thus to no one’s surprise that patent litigation statistics seem to contain valuable information 
regarding innovation. After all, the decision to prosecute is an indicator o f how valuable 
firms perceive their intellectual property to be, for if  they did not consider it important they 
would have not litigated against possible infringement.32
To provide an example that shows how litigation can affect the value of a patent, 
Lanjouw (1998 b), working on patent renewal data from Germany, estimates that a doubling 
of legal fees could result in a 20-30% reduction in the mean value o f patent protection in 
pharmaceuticals and other technologies. There is every reason to believe that there has been 
an increase in legal fees, mainly because there has been an increase in patent infringement 
cases,33 initiated (as many argue) by the formation o f the CAFC, which took a tougher 
stance against infringement. To see how this increase came about one has only to look at 
patent litigation data from the early 20th century.
Specifically, Federico (1964) provided validity and infringement data for litigated 
patents during the years 1925-1954. He found that courts upheld the validity o f patents 
in only about 30-40% of the cases in which validity was an issue.34 In a later study by 
Koenig (1980), with data from 1953-1978, district and circuit courts found patents valid 
about 35% of time.35 The above pattern was to drastically change with the introduction
32 For a literature review on patent litigation see Lanjouw and Lemer (1997).
33 For a report see, Korman (1998).
34 He also concluded that prior art before the courts was often better than used by the PTO in issuing the 
patent, based on his observation that accused infringers were generally more successful in convincing courts 
to invalidate patents on the basis o f incited prior art than on the basis o f cited prior art.
35 Koening collected all patent cases reported in the US PTO in the years 1953-1978 to produce an array of
descriptive statistics. She also selected a random sample o f 150 patents from the years 1953-1967 for more
in-depth study. In addition to finding that most courts held patents invalid, and noting the wide disparity of 
validity rates across regional circuits, she also found that obviousness was the most frequent used basis for 
judicial invalidation o f patents.
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of the CAFC. This was because the CAFC raised the evidentiary standards required to 
challenge patent validity and broadened the interpretation of patent breadth, see Merges 
(1997). Furthermore, the court relaxed the requirement that patents be granted only for 
inventions that are not obvious to practitioners skilled in the art.36 The above changes lead 
to a higher plaintiff success rate. Specifically, Harmon (1991) finds that from 1982 to 
1990, the CAFC affirmed 90% of district court decisions holding patents to be valid and 
infringed, and reversed 28% of the judgments of invalidity and non-infringement. As a 
result the overall probability that a litigated patent will be held to be valid has risen to 54%, 
see Allison and Lemley (1998).37 Subsequently, as Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) note, 
the implied average expected likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail is about 35% for all 
patent cases, which is higher than all o f the other categories except contracts.
Overall, as Jaffe (2000) observes, the litigation rate is 1% of all patents. However, 
there are large differences across sectors, with the likelihood of litigation in the drugs 
and health field being roughly double the overall average. Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2004) report that, for their data sample, there are (on average) 19 case fillings per thou­
sand patents. They also find a lot of variation between industries. For example, the lowest 
rates are found in chemicals (11.80), electronics (15.4), and mechanical (16.9). To the au­
thors’ surprise, filing rates for pharmaceutical patents are only modestly higher that the
average. The rates are much higher for patents in other health, computers, biotechnology,
36 See Cooley (1994), Dunner et al (1995) and Lunney (2001).
37 Allison and Lemley find that the probability o f validity does not vary significantly by technology field, or 
the nationality of the inventor. They also note that the average final validity finding occurs about 9 years after 
the patent was granted and about 12 years after the application date. However, Waldfogel (1998) finds that 
cases that resolve in 3 months are won by the patentee 84% of the time and cases resolved within a year are 
won 61% of the time. This suggests that the fact that only half o f cases carried to conclusion are won by the 
patentee greatly understates the likelihood that a random patent can be enforced.
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and miscellaneous. Along these lines, Lemer (1995) finds that within biotechnology about 
6% of all patents end up in litigation, while Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) estimate 
that US patents from the early 1980’s will, by the time they expire, generate more than one 
suit for every hundred patents.
If one is to take a more micro look at litigation statistics then a pattern emerges con­
necting litigation to size of patent portfolio and number of claims. The latest research on 
this topic is by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004, 1997). They find that having a larger 
portfolio o f patents reduces the probability of filing a suit on any individual patent in the 
portfolio. As they note, for a (small) domestic unlisted company with a small portfolio 
o f 100 patents, the average probability of litigating a given patent is 2%. For a company 
with a similar profile but with a moderate portfolio of 500 patents the figure drops to 0.5%. 
However, the probability o f litigation increases with the number o f claims and forward ci­
tations per claim, and the effects are substantial. In addition, this portfolio effect is stronger 
for smaller companies, as measured by employment. It seems that, for small firms, hav­
ing a portfolio o f patents is likely to be a key mechanism for avoiding litigation. Lanjouw 
and Schankerman also find evidence o f a threat value associated with having control over 
many patents in an area. This suggests that firms having portfolios that are large relative 
to the disputants they are likely to encounter are significantly less likely to make use o f the 
courts.
Some of their lesser (but nevertheless important) findings can be summed up as fol­
lows,
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a) Domestic listed companies are far less likely to prosecute infringement than un­
listed companies and individuals.
b) About 80% of all suits that are ever settled are settled before a pre-trial hearing is 
held. Nearly all o f the remaining settlement occurs before the trial commences. Specifi­
cally, post-filing settlement rates are about 95%, and most settlements occur soon after the 
suit is filed, often before the pre-trial hearing is held.
c) Win rates are close to 50%, while the mean litigation probability is 0.0135.
d) The main characteristics of patents and their owners do not affect the probability 
of settlement after a suit is filed, nor the plaintiff win rates for cases that reach trial. In 
addition, post-suit outcomes (the probability of settlement and the patentee win rates at 
trial) are almost completely independent of the agent-characteristics.
This negative link between size and patent litigation can possibly be the result of 
high litigation costs. In detail, as Merges (1999) points out, the expenses o f conducting 
a patent infringement case can cost from 1$ million to several millions. If one is take a 
closer look at the total cost o f patent litigation then the numbers are roughly one fourth of 
basic research expenses. Specifically, Lemer (1994) reports that, from July 1989 to June 
1990, 1318 patent related suits were initiated in the US Federal Court and approximately 
3900 procedures within the US PTO. He estimates, based on historical costs, that these 
cases will involve legal expenditures of about one billion 1991 dollars, which should be 
compared with expenditure on basic research o f 3.7 billion by US firms in 1991 (i.e. 27%
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of expenditures on basic research by firms that year).38 Due to this high cost 55% of small 
firms and 33% of large firms report that litigation is a deterrent to innovation.
Along the same lines, Lanjouw and Lemer (2001, 1996) find that preliminary injunc­
tions are a remedy that may be available only to financially strong plaintiffs.39 40 Moreover, 
legal expenses are likely to be higher for unlisted firms, which are typically smaller firms, 
and for individuals because of their greater reliance on external legal counsel. Direct sur­
vey evidence also supports this link between size and litigation. In their 1994 survey of 
1478 managers of US R&D units, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) ask respondents to in­
dicate the most important reasons, out of five possibilities, for not having patented recent 
innovations. These five reasons were, difficulty in demonstrating novelty, disclosure, ease 
o f inventing around a patent, the cost o f the application, and the cost o f enforcement. In 
general, small firms believed that their patents were infringed more frequently, but were 
considerably less likely to litigate these perceived infringements.
But even for listed firms (which are typically o f larger size) the burden is non- 
negligible. Specifically, Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994) examine the market reaction 
to the filing o f 20 patent infringement suits reported in the Wall Street Journal during the 
1981-1983 period. They find that in the two-day window ending on the day the story 
appears in the Journal, the combined market-adjusted value of the firms fell by 3.1% on av­
erage. Lemer (1995), using data on 26 patents suits between biotechnology firms, finds an
38 To the above cost one should add damages awards, which have increased since the formation o f the CAFC, 
Merges (1997), Kortum and Lemer (1999).
39 In univariate comparisons, disputes in which preliminary injunctions are requested have plaintiffs almost 
twice as large, in terms o f sales, employment, and cash equivalents, as those in disputes where preliminary 
injections are not requested. The plaintiff is also significantly more likely to be bigger than the defendant.
40 See also Cunningham (1995).
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average fall o f 2%. This represents a median loss of shareholder wealth of 20$ million. It 
suffices to say that if  a defendant is unable to raise capital to finance the litigation through 
external capital markets, he may be forced to settle the dispute, no matter what the ulti­
mate merits of his case are. In conclusion, litigation seems to be a powerful obstacle in 
protecting one’s intellectual property, especially in cases where the litigant is o f small size. 
This latter effect seems to be acknowledged by the EU, which commissioned a study on the 
problems that SMS EU firms face when protecting their patents in US courts; see Kingston
(2000). This study, apart from acknowledging the high litigation cost, notes that juries tend 
to be more friendly to local (infringing) firms, forcing the plaintiff (the EU SMS) to take 
its case to a higher court. This latter choice is by definition a rather costly and lengthy 
alternative.
1.5 Designing an optimal patent
Having examined the role o f patents as a stimulant or deterrent to innovation, this section 
will revisit the question of optimal patent design. Bearing in mind that patents are two 
dimensional, affirming their effects though patent length (which now stands at 20 years) 
and patent breadth41 (the set of claims, and their adjacent technological territory, that the 
courts and the patent office consider to be fit for patent protection), the main problem that 
policy makers face is how to fine-tune these two different attributes in a way that best pro­
motes innovation, while least reducing the public’s social welfare. The starting point on any 
discussion of intellectual property must be the seminal contribution o f Nordhaus (1969).
41 Also known as scope.
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Nordhaus explained why patents should have finite length. His argument was that, assum­
ing that the policy maker’s only concern is to encourage innovation, then patents should 
last forever. However, if his sole concern is to avoid the deadweight loss (which is cre­
ated by the monopoly that patents grand), then there should be no intellectual protection at 
all. A finite length o f protection balances these two concerns. Nordhaus’s work set forth 
a sizable literature on patent design, one that in broad terms considers patent races, imita­
tion by rivals, technology licensing and how the design question changes when technology 
is sequential. With the above in mind, this section will first focus on patent breadth, con­
centrating at first on static technologies. In the second part of this section I will turn my 
attention to technologies of sequential nature.
Chronologically, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) were the first to introduce the notion 
of patent breadth into the Nordhaus analysis. In Gilbert and Shapiro patent breadth is the 
price that an innovator is able to charge for the product that embodies the innovation. As 
they show, maximizing social surplus over all combinations o f prices and patent lengths 
(combinations that yield enough revenue to cover the cost o f R&D), optimal patent length 
is infinite and patent breadth should be set at the level that just covers R&D investment.
Gilbert and Shapiro’s argument for patents that are narrow and long was first chal­
lenged by Gallini (1992). Allowing for costly imitation o f patented innovations, Gallini’s 
argument was that, with costly imitation a rival’s decision to imitate depends on the length 
o f patent protection. Therefore, the longer the patent life the more likely it is that rivals will 
‘invent around’ the patented product. Extending patent life, therefore, may not provide the 
innovator with increased incentives for R&D. As it turns out, using both patent length and
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breadth as instruments, the optimal patent policy consists o f broad patents with patent life 
adjusted to achieve the desired reward. That is, patents should be long enough to generate 
the required revenue for the patent holder, and broad enough to prevent imitation.
However, there is an important caveat in the above models, because this reversal de­
pends on the absence of any assumptions about licensing. For example, in the Gallini 
model, if the patent is too long or too narrow, the innovator is assumed to watch inertly 
as imitators erode his market share. The question then is, can this duplicative waste be 
avoided voluntarily through licensing rather than by adjusting patent policy? As Maurer 
and Scotchmer (1998) point out, whatever the market outcome without licensing, the in­
novator and potential entrants can achieve the same market outcome through a licensing 
agreement with appropriate royalties. Since both the innovator and potential entrants can 
jointly save the imitation costs, they prefer licensing to imitation. In this argument, since 
there is always an unlicensed potential entrant, the licensor is worried about imitation by 
non-licensees as well as by licensees. Accordingly, the patent holder commits to a low 
market price precisely to reduce the attractiveness o f entry by non-licensees.
Bearing the above in mind, it is worth analyzing whether licensing can potentially 
increase the market price. This can be achieved by considering the case o f a single potential 
entrant, as in Gallini (1994). Specifically, Gallini suggests that with a single potential 
entrant (or a fixed number), the optimal licensing strategy is one o f monopoly price with 
high royalties, and to share the revenues by using other fees. Thereby, the licensor has an 
incentive to keep the market price high regardless o f the cost o f imitation.
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This section has up to now shown that, in a framework where goods are homogeneous 
and patent breadth governs market price, licensing prevents wasteful imitation. In this 
context, if licenses are available one can argue for narrow and long patents. By contrast, if 
licensing is not available, this analysis points to patents that are broad and short.
It suffices to say that for a variety o f reasons licensing may not occur. This being the 
case, one needs a more thorough investigation o f the arguments presented by Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990) as well as Gallini (1992). Such an analysis is provided by Denicolo (1996). 
He explains that narrow (and long) or broad (and short) patents depend on the concavity 
or convexity, respectively, of the relationship between social welfare and post-innovation 
profit. Situations in which relatively short broad patents are optimal include costly imita­
tion; a Coumot duopoly with constant marginal costs; and horizontally differentiated firms 
and linear transportation costs, as in Klemperer (1990).
The above discussion is limited to isolated innovations. A complexity that aroused in­
terest from early on is that early innovators lay a foundation for later innovations. Thereby, 
a later innovation could not be made without the earlier one. Scotchmer (1991) was the 
first to contribute to this discussion. As she noted, in order for the first innovator to have 
enough incentive to invest, he should be given some claim on the profit o f the later innova­
tion. Otherwise, early innovators could be under rewarded for the social value they create. 
Therefore, the problem is how to divide profits between both innovators in a way that re­
spects their costs. Otherwise, if  all profits are allocated to the first innovator, the second 
inventor’s incentive for research is reduced and vice versa. Green and Scotchmer (1995) 
argue that because o f the difficulties in dividing profit, when innovation is sequential patent
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lives will have to be smaller. Furthermore, one needs not to alter patent design for the same 
result can be achieved with ex ante licensing i.e. licensing before investments are made.42
A danger o f intellectual property, as Merges and Nelson (1990) point out, is that in­
tellectual property can stifle innovation and slow progress because the monopoly awarded 
by patents deters further R&D into this technology. This negative attitude towards patents 
is countered by Kitch (1977), who argues that broad patents are socially beneficial be­
cause they stimulate further developments. However, there still remains an important issue 
concerning how these developments will manifest themselves in the absence o f contract­
ing/licensing from the original patent holder. This is at the center of Scotchmer (1991) and 
Green and Scotchmer (1995), who focus on how ex ante contracting affects the division of 
profits.43 This theme is also advanced by Merges (1999), Scotchmer (1996), O ’Donoghue, 
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) and Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001). Lastly, Matutes, 
Regibeau and Rockett (1996) and Chang (1995) argue for broad patents even without as­
suming that ex ante contracts can be made.
Turning one’s attention to the novelty that the patent office requires for a patent 
award, several arguments favouring both weak and strict standards for patent protection 
have been advanced. Green and Scotchmer (1990) argue for a weak novelty requirement 
standard. Under such a standard firms will be encouraged to disclose every small bit o f
progress. However, as Green and Scotchmer warn, while these disclosures could speed
42 To the above argument one should also add that, in a framework o f sequential innovation statutory patent 
life is not as important. What matters is the effective life, that is, the time until the non-infringing substi­
tute appears, see Scotchmer (1991), and O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998). The effective life is 
determined by leading breadth, which is interpreted as the minimum quality improvement that avoids in­
fringement.
43 With ex ante contracting, the role of breadth is not to determine whether subsequent products are made 
(they will be made if  they add to joint profit), but rather to determine how the profit is divided.
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up invention by giving a technological boost to competitors, they can also encourage in­
novators to rest on secrecy instead of patents. By contrast, a tightening of the standards 
can encourage innovators to be more ambitious in the improvements they attempt to de­
velop (O’Donoghue, (1998)). In addition, a tightening o f the standards can affect the di­
vision o f profit among sequential researchers. Scotchmer (1996) suggests that, as long 
as a second-generation product can be protected by an exclusive license on the infringed 
patent of the earlier generation, providing no protection for second-generation products 
would be in favor o f the earlier innovators, without jeopardizing second-generation ad­
vances. Contrasting this view, Denicolo (2000), in a model in which firms race for the 
first and second-generation patents, shows that tilting profits in favor o f earlier innovators 
might only encourage a socially wasteful patent race at the basic research stage and under 
investment in the second stage.
Notwithstanding the above, licensing is not problem free. First o f all it raises an­
titrust issues. Furthermore, due to the ‘anti commons ’ problem licensing is likely to fail, 
see Heller and Eisenberg (1998). The sequential nature of innovation raises another is­
sue. Licensing can suppress non-infringing follow-on products, reducing product-market 
competition. One should add that assuming such licensing occurred ex post (to prevent 
production o f the cost-reducing innovation after it had been developed), it would be an an­
titrust violation. Chang (1995) analyzes that type of ex post collusion and is in favor of a 
strict antitrust rule against collusion. Lastly, Besen and Maskin (2000) argue that if  firms 
do not license in a way that takes full advantage o f their intellectual property (say because
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of antitrust restrictions), then licensing may reduce industry profits below those available 
without licensing, and the broad patents that support such licensing are counterproductive.
1.6 Conclusions
A well-known American proverb suggests that one should not try to fix something that 
is not broken. As the above sections explain, there are many problems associated with 
patents, enough to deem the patents system, possibly not broken, but, in any case, in need 
of treatment. These problems are related to the monopolistic nature o f patents, as well as 
to inherent inabilities associated with the way such an elaborate apparatus is built and run. 
Nonetheless, assuming that the patent system is broken, does a better alternative exist? To 
be fair, the argument here is similar to the one that in many occasions is posed in favor of 
democracy. Indeed, the patent system may not be the best way to reward innovations, but 
is better than any other alternative that has so far been proposed or tested.
To illustrate these claims, I have reviewed the literature concentrating on the bene­
fits and maladies o f the patent system, paying special attention to the way litigation can 
stagnate innovation. In addition, I have asked the question of whether there is a better al­
ternative to patents. The answer there is negative, if  one is to consider only the radical 
proposals. However, according to more modest approaches, there is certainly a lot o f room 
for improvements on the current patent system. Much of my effort has also concentrated 
on the optimal patent design, considering that patent protection affirms itself in two differ­
ent directions, length and breadth. Again, as it turns out the literature has not yet provided
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a clear-cut answer to this riddle, even though the case for broad and short patents seems to 
be more persistent in its articulation.
I laboured my point using empirical results that have recently been available. These 
results include patent statistics as well as patent litigation statistics. All these data seem to 
overwhelmingly point out that in recent years patent protection has become a matter o f great 
importance to innovators. However, these results do not have the capacity to indicate if this 
increase in patent awareness has also led to an increase in innovations. Even though, as 
the clock ticks, newer results are expected to come out, the seminal contributions by Jaffe, 
Trajenberg, Hall and Henderson (to name but a few), as included in Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2002), seem to indicate that in many cases this overwhelming increase in patent counts did 
not equally manifest itself in more or better innovations.
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Chapter 2
Understanding When Universities and Firms 
Form RJVs: The Importance of Intellectual
Property Protection
2.1 Introduction
In the early 1980s, the Bayh-Dole Act enabled universities to patent their innovations eas­
ier than before. The purpose o f the Act was to foster US innovative activity, especially 
between firms and universities, at a time when fears were mounting that the US was a tech­
nological laggard compared to Japan. There is no doubt that universities and firms had been 
jointly doing research well before the Bayh-Dole Act, Rosenberg and Nelson (1994). Nev­
ertheless, the Act was successful in bridging many barriers between firms and universities, 
leading them to form Research Joint Ventures (RJV). Indeed there seems to be an increase 
in RJVs, not only between US firms and US universities, Baldwin and Link (1998), but, 
as figure 2.1 displays, between EU firms and US universities as well, Link and Vonortas 
(2002). However, as Hall, Link and Scott (2000) note, this increase is not as high as one 
would have anticipated. In explaining this shortfall in RJVs, Hall, Link and Scott (2000) 
stressed (among other reasons) the importance o f Intellectual Property (IP) protection in 
setting obstacles to the formation o f RJVs.
The aim o f this chapter is to try to understand under what conditions firms are likely 
to form an RJV with a university and when can IP issues raise barriers. The theoretical
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literature on this issue is rather slim. With the exception o f Beath et al. (2003) and Poyago- 
Theotoky et al. (2002), I am not aware of any other work, which studies the potential 
barriers in the formation of RJVs.
The thesis advanced in this chapter is that firms and universities, whose research is 
on new-technologies,44 will find it easier to form such RJVs. A finding as such seems to 
be in line with evidence offered by Hall, Link and Scott (2001) and Link and Vonortas 
(2002). In explaining the above proposition, this thesis stresses the importance of the de­
gree o f IP protection. Specifically, this chapter shows that the optimal policy for a firm 
(university) that conducts research on a fast evolving and not well-understood technology 
(i.e. a new-technology) is to share it, by choosing to have a low degree o f IP protection.45 
For example, when Bell Laboratories invented the transistor, which is a classic example of 
a new-technology, they licensed their patent to most competitors. At the time, Bell Labora­
tories recognized that they should forego some of their profits to benefit from the extended 
knowledge produced by spillovers.46
Keeping this in mind, when a firm (university) chooses to join an RJV, the firm must 
also account for its opportunity cost (the profits that it sacrifices by halting the research that 
it conducts on its own),47 and the greater this opportunity cost is, the harder it will be for
44 Technologies that are closer to science and evolve faster than well-developed and well-understood tech­
nologies.
45 This argument is similar to Ben-Shahar and Jacob (2001). However, in their study, the innovator may 
optimally choose a low IP protection policy to lock-in other innovators, who will be using his technology to 
innovate and hence monopolize the market.
46 In an interview, the head o f Bell Laboratories recognized that what they had invented was beyond their 
capacity. So they licenced it, for a small amount, hoping that their invention would bring returns in the form 
of 'angel dust’. For a detailed account of the invention of the transistor see Rosenberg (1994), Mowery and 
Rosenberg (1989), and Nelson (1962).
47 The firm (university) will stop its own similar research to avoid duplication. However, this does not imply 
that the firm (university) will halt its research altogether.
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a firm to enter such a research partnership. However, as the above paradigm emphasizes, 
'mature ’ technologies will generate greater profits, because the firm does not have to share 
them. Thus, the opportunity cost for firms that already work on ‘mature ’ technologies will 
be greater. Thereby, firms and universities which conduct research on new-technologies 
will incur a lower opportunity cost, making them the most likely participants of an RJV. 
This finding is reinforced if one is to assume that universities concentrate their research 
only on new technologies.48
This line o f thinking suggests that a large firm, operating many different research 
projects at the same time (thus being most likely to work on new-technologies among other 
things), should find it easier to form an RJV, because it would have a lower opportunity 
cost. This accords with the evidence presented by Caloghirou, Vorontas and Tsakanikas 
(2000), who find that firms that sell on average over 1 billion Euros tend to cooperate much 
more with universities.
In what follows, section 2.2 introduces the ‘technology generating’ function, section 
2.3 describes demand, while section 2.4 explains the maximization problem o f the innova­
tor, to be followed by sections 2.5 and 2.6 that find the optimal degree o f IP protection and 
the conditions under which an RJV will be formed.
2.2 Technology
48 Such an assumption is made by Beath et al. (2003).
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2.2.1 An overview and some examples
In this section I will define, and provide examples, of the terms (such as innovation, RJV, 
university) that I will henceforth be using. In addition, I will present a summary of the 
way that individual innovators generate innovations and their objectives (the mathematical 
definitions will be provided in the sections that follow).
Specifically, heterogeneous innovators (firms) create patentable innovations, with a 
patent length of one year, through a discrete time technology generation process. At each 
point t in time, each innovator i creates an innovation, A A tii. The definition of an innova­
tion is the following, ‘an invention [which in my model becomes an innovation, a marketed 
technological advance] is a new means o f  achieving some function not obvious beforehand 
to someone skilled in the prior a r t’, Kline and Rosenberg (1986).49 The sum of the innova­
tions created by the innovator up to that time, makes the innovator’s technology A t^. This 
is similar to many different quality ladders,50 each one representing only one technology.51
Each innovator conducts research on only one technology. The technology that each 
innovator is working on will be a substitute to the technologies that the rest of the innovators 
are working on. In the context of a ‘P C ’ environment, one can think of such substitute 
technologies as the work o f many individual innovators who at the same time try to create 
a better ‘MP3 player ’, or a better ‘Media Player ’. In this setting, the knowledge created 
by each innovator would be potentially beneficial to the research carried out by all other
49 The brackets were not included in the original.
50 See Grossman and Helpman (1991).
51 There is a considerable literature which explores the time technology generation process in situations 
where the R&D investment o f the firm endogenously shapes technology. For a review see Baldwin and Scott 
(1987).
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innovators in the form of knowledge spillovers; however, some form of tacit knowledge will 
be assumed, which does not allow an innovator to fully appropriate such spillovers. These 
knowledge spillovers are created when the innovator patents his innovation. Thereby, the 
work carried on the ‘M P3player ’ can be beneficial to the innovator working on the ‘Media 
player’.52 The objective of each innovator is to create a better technology, since, as it 
will become apparent in later sections, one increases the demand for his technology by 
improving it further.
I define patent breadth as the amount that an innovator can re-innovate around the 
technology of any other innovator (without being found guilty o f copying one’s technology) 
and thus use it in his research, in the form of knowledge spillovers, without paying any 
property rights. The larger the patent breadth is, the harder it is for an innovator to fully re- 
innovate around one’s technology. In what follows, I will assume that if the patent breadth 
is equal to 1, then innovator i must make full use (and pay property rights) o f the technology 
created by innovator j , j  ^  i, similarly, if  the patent breadth is 0, then innovator i can freely 
copy the technology created by innovator j ,  without paying any property rights.53
Based on the assumptions provided in the above paragraph, the patent breadth can 
neither be 0, nor 1. Specifically, having assumed the existence o f tacit knowledge, the 
patent breadth cannot be equal to 0, because even if innovator j  could freely appropriate 
the innovation of innovator z, he would still find it impossible to use it as well as its inventor.
52 Thereby, the technologies generated by the innovators are substitutes which generate spillovers that are 
complements. This assumption attempts to capture the multidimensional nature o f innovation, where knowl­
edge spillovers can be beneficial even though they may have been generated by a technology that is a substi­
tute. This accords with the evidence offered by Hall and Ziedonis (2001), who study the microprocessor’s 
industry, noting that firms use overlapping technologies, many o f which have been discovered by other firms 
who share the same market.
53 My definition o f patent breadth corresponds to that o f Denicolo (1996).
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In addition, one should cancel out full IP protection, because in reality, due to spillovers, 
such a thing does not exist.54
In this framework, universities are research centers that specialize in both new and 
‘mature ’ technologies. Through the term new-technology I imply a technology that is close 
to science. Such technologies have a large developing horizon, and they tend to move faster 
than ‘mature ’ and well understood technologies. A general example o f such a technology 
would be software.
An RJV will be a partnership between the firm and the university, a partnership in 
which both partners decide in advance on how to split the gains and the cost of their re­
search. Hence, I will assume that they form a very simple agreement, where each partner 
appropriates a set percentage o f either gains and cost (this percentage does not have to be 
the same for either gains and cost).
For an innovator to innovate, he needs knowledge spillovers. However, unless one 
is willing to assume that all innovators are homogeneous in their innovative capacity, the 
knowledge spillovers generated by one innovator should not have the same effect on one’s 
research, as those created by another innovator. This generates the problem of discrim­
inating among the spillovers-generating capacities o f many innovators, each working on 
different technologies. In order to account for this problem I will assume that a patent race 
takes place, in which each innovator races against a set ‘target’. In the setting o f the ‘Win-
54 There is a large empirical literature pointing to this. For example, the research o f Pakes and Shankerman 
(1979), has identified the effect that spillovers, diffused from major research centers (such as universities), 
have in fostering innovation. For the effects o f academic research on innovation see Mansfield (1995), Jaffe 
(1989) and Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998). In addition, Jaffe (1986) displayed the importance of the 
R&D spillovers, which are generated using a local pool o f R&D, on the patent productivity of a firm. Spatial 
models as such can be found in Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Kao, Chiang and Chen (1999).
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clows ’ environment, a 'target ’ could be the demand for an ‘MP3 p layer ' that has double 
compressing ability. The ability of the innovator who works on the ‘MP3 player ’ to create 
such a player, will determine how useful his spillovers are to all the other innovators.
2.2.2 Technology generation
Technology is produced by risk neutral innovators, who employ a specific ‘technology 
generating ' function. Specifically, there exist a continuum of innovators, operating in an 
economy that lacks a credit market, and faces no population growth, who create innova­
tions A A t,i, using knowledge spillovers s, as well as some funding through past profits
7T^ i ,z *55 However, accounting for the lag between the publication of the patent and the time
that it spillovers into research, Pakes and Schankerman (1979), innovators will be using 
st- i .  Overall, the innovations created by innovator [0, n ] , are generated through the 
following ‘technology generating ’ function,
A At , i  =  St- i7T t- i ti + Vi, Vi ~ (0, a), 2G[0, n]  (2.1)
The sum of the A A tfi, is a distinct technology line A tji, which is created by innovator i, 
having the following initial condition for A tfi, A 0ti > 0, and no initial funding (7r_i;; =  0).
t
Hence, A tyi = A q^  +  ^  A A tyi. Equation (2.1) implies that s t- i, 7rt- i  are substitutes that
i
carry the same weight. Even though, this is a ‘convenient’ simplification, there is no con­
sensus among economists regarding the effect that spillovers have. Specifically, depending 
on the author, spillovers can account for 15% to 40% of an innovation, Griliches (1998).
55 In reality, firms can invest their profits, among other things, in capital stock, consumption and dividends 
to shareholders. However, since in this model no production function is specified and there is lack o f share­
holders and consumption, I am making the assumption that all past period’s profits are used in innovating.
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Furthermore, equation (2.1) suggests that in the absence o f spillovers there is no A A tji no 
matter how big 7rt-i,i is. This assumption corresponds to the idea that no innovation can be 
created in vacuum and spillovers are essential and necessary when creating an innovation.
In equation (2.1), Vi is distributed with mean 0 and variance cr, where a is assumed 
to be exogenous. Due to vi, innovators who have similar (st- 1, i i t - i ) will not produce 
innovations of the same magnitude. In that respect, Vi represents the innovator’s ability to 
innovate. I will assume that even though the innovator knows his realization of vi, he is 
not aware o f Vj, i ^  j ,  until the race finishes. Hence, the innovator is unaware o f the full 
magnitude of A A tj .  Since can attain negative values it is possible for A A tyi to be less 
than zero. If this turns out to be the case, it implies that research has followed a wrong 
path producing a technology A tit- that is less than past technology Accordingly, the
innovator will not make use of A A tj  in production, using his past technology instead.56
An example o f a technology that did not generate the expected results, and in many 
respects was judged as inferior to its predecessor, would be High Definition TV (HDTV). 
In the late 1980’s this was a promising European TV standard that turned out to be far more 
costly and outdated (when compared to the USA TV technology of its time).57
As I mentioned in section 2.1, each innovator aims at reaching some set ‘goals/targets ’. 
These goals can be considered as the expectation of the society as to what it wants future 
technology to be. These goals can be set by either a governmental body or by a central
56 Alternatively, in order to avoid A A t,i having a negative value, one can assume that is lognormally 
distributed.
57 In 1991 the European Commission, in an initiative that was backed up by various satellite interests, 
proposed an expensive plan, which was worth o f 850 million Euro, to support the HDTV standard plan. 
There was considerable debate in the Council about the budget, but finally the issue was dropped, with the 
justification being that a more advanced technology was already available in the US. For a detailed discussion 
o f the HDTV project see Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
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planner (who acts for the benefit of the society). An example o f such a target set by the 
society (central planner) is the goal to create medication for AIDS. An example for a gov­
ernment set target would be the standards set in defence contracts. In both cases, innovators 
try to create innovations that can reach these targets.58 Henceforth, I will use the general 
term ‘social target ’ in order to describe these ‘goals/targets
I will make the assumption that the expectation for future technology that society has 
(the ‘social target ’), will depend positively on how innovative (in its capacity to produce 
innovations that have a greater AA) this technological sector has been (the MP3 industry 
in this case). This line of thinking suggests that, when dealing with a very innovative tech­
nological sector, society will have greater expectations for this technology, in comparison 
to the technology created by a less innovative technological sector.59
An intuitive example of such a ‘social target' is, A<pt = a  dj^j, a > 1.
This equation, expresses the ‘social target’ A (f)t as a function of the average innovation 
created by all innovators (  e  [0,1], C <  n, who managed to innovate at time t — 1. In this 
setting, the greater the average innovation ^ f  is, the greater A (pt will be. In
addition, a higher a  indicates a technology for which A(pt moves faster. Allowing different 
technologies to have a different a , one can discriminate between technologies for which 
A(f)t moves faster compared to others.
58 For a similar assumption see Scott (1996, 1997).
59 Taking the above argument into extremes, suggest that Say’s law is at work here, since the supply of  
innovations will determine the expectations o f the society as regards to what it wants the new technology to 
be. Schmookler (1966), in his survey o f the innovations produced by the railway industry, notes evidence of  
this.
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Returning to the paradigm offered in the previous section, a greater a  allows one 
to model the central planner’s goal for the MP3 technology (a new-technology) as faster 
moving compared to that of the steam engine technology (a ‘mature ’ technology).60 In 
this context, A i s  an indicator of how useful this technology is to society. In contrast to 
A 0t, A A  is a quantitative index which expresses the magnitude of the technology, when 
compared to its initial starting point A q.
Each innovator will be endowed with a probability o f reaching the ‘social target ’. 
This probability will be exogenous61 and it will be a function of the innovator’s ability to 
innovate p (v i)  € [0, 1], where E p (v i)  ^  062 and >  0, < 0. In this context,
p (vi) (for simplicity pi) describes by how far the innovator will advance, compared to the 
‘social target’. If pi = 1, then he will manage to create an innovation that is equal to the 
full magnitude of A</>ti if  Pi is less than one then his innovation will be PiA<pt. Hence, each 
innovator i is expected to generate an innovation o f magnitude EpiA<j>t.
It should be noted that, if an innovator creates an innovation that is greater than 
the ‘social target ’ A<fit, then only he will be able to fully appreciate his innovation. All 
the other innovators have a limited foresight, hence they will not be able to comprehend 
the innovation’s full magnitude. In this case, the innovator will have created some tacit 
knowledge, in the form of an additional increment, that can only be used by him and it will 
not spillover to others.
60 The steam technology, as David (1990) notes, was the main technology driving production until early in 
the 20th century.
61 Scott (1996, 1997) allows firms investing in R&D to generate innovations that aim for the social target, 
but instead of assuming the probability o f success as exogenous, it is an endogenous function o f the firm’s 
R&D.
62 E  is the expectation operator.
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In this framework, the ‘social target ’ A (j)t, introduces a multidimensional tournament 
effect, that allows one to discriminate among otherwise homogeneous agents. Hence, each 
innovator competes not with others, but with an endogenous goal A c/)t. How well the inno­
vator performs in such a race, depends on his ability to innovate Vi. Thereby, p (Vi) displays 
how good the innovator’s technology is. In other words, p ( )  is a weight indicating to the 
rest o f the innovators how useful the innovator’s technology is and how much of it should 
they use; i.e. p (V{) A 4>t.
Assuming for simplicity that n = 1, the average spillovers that each innovator attains 
are equal to,
o
where Q is the percentage of innovator’s who actually innovate.63 For simplicity equation
(2.2) can be expressed as,
where 6 =  f  pldj. Substituting this equation into the ‘technology generating’ function, one
o
can derive the expected innovation created by innovator i as,
2.3 Demand
This section will concentrate on describing the demand for a good that is produced using 
a specific technology in a frictionless Walrasian market of size M . In this economy, at
63 Since n =  1, ( t equals the number o f innovators who innovate as well.
(2 .2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
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time t, each innovator i, i e  [0,1] will produce one innovation A A tji, which will be used 
in the production of one good. The good produced through the use of innovation A A tti, 
will be consumed by a homogeneous mass of consumers who are infinitely lived, have 
identical additive preferences, defined over lifetime consumption and a constant rate of 
time preference r. Goods are substitutes, and innovations are assumed to be non-drastic. 
As a result, there is demand for all innovations.
Specifically, the value of the demand Qtj  for a good i, that has been manufactured 
through the use of the innovation made by the i innovator at time t, is given by the following 
expression,
A A ■
Qt,i = M -  , A A tji € (0 , oo) (2.5)
j  A A tjd j
0
In the above equation, similar to Scott (1997), Qtii depends in a positive fashion on the
latest innovation developed by i, and in a negative fashion on the innovations created by
i
the rest of the innovators, i.e. f  A A tjd j. Demand Qtyi does not depend on the level of
o
technology A t,i because, bearing in mind that patents last for one period, A t~\ is common 
among all innovators, which suggests that consumers must concentrate only on the vintage 
attributes o f this technology.
Furthermore, equation (2.5), implies that the total demand for all goods will be equal 
to M . If  there is only one innovator i, Qti  will also be equal to M , suggesting that this 
innovator will be able to appropriate the whole market. In general terms, equation (2.5) 
follows the intuition introduced by Dockner, Jorgensen, Long and Sorger (2000), who treat 
demand in the same fashion, albeit in the context o f capital accumulation games, during 
which demand is a function of the accumulated capital o f different agents.
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2.4 The innovator’s profits
In this framework, when an innovator creates an innovation he immediately patents his 
innovation and licences it to competitors for a royalty that is equal to the size o f the in­
novation that they will be employing in their research. This being the case, if  innovator i 
chooses to use PjA(f>t o f the research that is carried out by innovator j ,  then he must pay 
him fpjA(j)t in property rights, where /  indicates the price for using knowledge. Hence­
forth /  is used as a numeraire, implying that innovator i must pay pjA(j)t .M However, how 
much of PjA(j)t innovator i will make use of, will depend on the patent breadth zf, where 
0 <  z \  < 1.
In what follows, I will assume that patent breadth is a choice variable for the inno­
vator. In reality, patent breadth is set out by the patent office (and the courts). However, it 
is up to the innovator to seek litigation if he feels that someone has been freely using his 
technology. Thus, the amount of technology transfer that takes place is up to the innova­
tor’s discretion. Accordingly, what I am modeling as a choice variable is not patent breadth 
per se, but technology transfer. For this reason, I will use the generic term IP protection in 
order to describe how much o f his technology the innovator decides to freely share.
Assumption 1: The choice o f  z f applied by innovator i on his innovation, when 
licensing it to innovator j, will be the same to the one that innovator j  chooses.
This assumption implies that there exists some form of reciprocality among innova­
tors. Hence, if  innovator i licences his innovation to innovator j  applying a z \  degree of IP
64 Henceforth, all variables will be expressed in terms o f / .
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protection, innovatory will reciprocate using a z \  degree o f IP protection towards innovator
Following assumption 1, innovator i will apply a z f  degree of IP protection to his 
innovation. Thus, innovator i will receive z ‘jp iA(f)t in royalties by each innovator who 
uses his innovation, and at the same time he has to pay property rights that are equal to 
ZtPjA4>t to each innovator j  whose innovation he makes use of. Assuming that ( t percent 
of innovators will choose to innovate, the average property rights that innovator i has to 
pay to the other innovators are equal to,
in addition, innovator i will receive
in property rights. In all, each innovator will derive some income, because his innovation 
A Ai is used in the production of the good i, moreover, he will benefit from the royalties 
that he receives from the other innovators who make use o f his technology. However, he 
also has to pay some royalties in order to benefit from the research of others. Accordingly,
65 Bessen (2002), and Shapiro (2001), have shown that many major firms have created patent thickets (patent 
portfolios) which they can use (if they chose to) to block, not just similar innovations, but also innovations 
that may follow alternative techniques. In reality, most firms seldom use their patent portfolios in order to 
block innovation, Teece (2000). Nevertheless, such patent thickets act as deterrents to any firm which may 
act as a challenger. This analysis seems to suggest that there exist principal agents who have the means and 
power to enforce their will. Thus, less prominent firms have no choice but to follow on the footsteps o f the 
major ones.
Thereby, if  the major patent portfolio holders choose to litigate a lot, the other firms are left with no other 
choice but to go to court. Similarly, if the major patent portfolio holders choose to avoid litigation, it is not to 
the interest o f less prominent firms to litigate against them (for if  they choose to go to court larger firms have 
two advantages: a greater patent portfolio, and more money, thus they should be the most likely to win any 
court case against them). In the light o f the above, assumption 1 is not unrealistic.
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the innovator’s average gross income will be equal to,66
h,i =  Q u  +  CtZ tP A ^ t ~  (2-6)
However, as Segerstrom (1998) notes, as the technology level increases it becomes harder 
to innovate. This is because starting technologies are easier to comprehend, while the more 
they develop they increasingly need more and more expertise. Thereby, the innovator has to 
pay a cost c for innovating, a cost that must be proportional to the innovation. Accounting 
for such a cost implies that technological growth will not follow an explosive path, allowing 
for a steady state solution. In what follows, I will model such a ‘technology development
. » c A A t  icost a s ,  1-.’ st
Using a formula as such implies that, the greater the degree o f spillovers st that 
the innovator can attain (through the use of the work carried out by others) the less the 
innovation cost that he has to incur. In other words, the more the people working on one 
field, the easier it is for one to innovate. Including such a ‘technology development cost ’ in 
equation (2.6), equation (2.6) becomes,
h i  =  Q t,i +  C A p A ' P t  -  -  C- ^ h i (2 .7)
St
where I assume that M  > 1 and c < 1, so as for Qt<i > -cA^ t’i , implying that the complexity
of an innovation cannot be large enough to hinder innovation.
Assuming that innovations are dissimilar, only a few innovators will actually have
a Q that is high enough to guarantee them a high income. This line o f thinking implies
that the amount o f royalties paid to the innovator, i.e. ( tz?piA(f)t , will be limited for the
66 In both the property rights that the innovator receives, as well as the royalties that he has to pay, I have 
not included the innovator’s own contribution pi A<p, because they cancel out.
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majority of the innovators. Consequently, some innovators will be adversely effected by 
the royalties that they have to pay, since their average gross income IUi will not be greater 
than zero. This implies that an increase in the degree o f IP protection z2 would decrease 
the number o f innovators who find it profitable to innovate; the ones whose average gross 
income I tji is greater than zero.
Proposition 1 There is negative relationship between the number o f innovators who find  
it profitable to innovate and the degree o f  IP protection.
Proof. Innovator i will find it optimal to innovate only if his gross income I tii is greater 
than zero. This suggests that the following inequality must hold,
Qt,i ~  C A - -- > Ct A ^ t  ~  Pi)
St
Since I have assumed that Qt,i > cA^ v , and 8 is greater than p for the majority o f the 
innovators, both sides of the above inequality are positive. Thus, increases in z \  imply that, 
for some innovators, the above inequality will not hold. Moreover, further increases in z \  
will affect a greater number o f innovators. ■
This finding seems realistic, if one accounts for the increased litigation that accom­
panies broadening patent protection.67 Furthermore, this proposition accords with the evi­
dence offered by Lemer (1995), who finds that in the biotechnology industry, when firms
are faced with a strong patent barrier, they choose to redirect their innovating effort to
projects where the patents that competitors have will not pose as many problems. Indirect
67 Galini (2001) reports that starting firms must be ready to spend 2-3 million $ in litigation, if  they want 
to either use other people’s patents, or protect their own. In addition, as Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) 
note, ‘fo r the most valuable drugs and health patents the estimated probability o f  litigation during the lifetime 
o f  the patent is more than 25%, and more than 10% in other technology fields. As a percentage o f  utilized 
patents, these litigation rates would be even higher
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evidence for this negative relationship is provided by Aghion et al. (2002). Specifically, 
measuring innovative activity through the use o f a weighted patent index, they find that a 
non-linear (inverted U) relationship exists between innovation and market competition.68 69
For mathematical convenience, I will assume that the number o f innovators who find 
it profitable to innovate is equal to e z^1 where e e  (0, l ) .70 Subsequently, if  one substitutes 
equation (2.3) in equation (2.7), and replaces ez^1 in place o f the innovator’s average 
income will become,
In this framework, following Jones (2001), the innovator will not appropriate all o f 
the income that is created from producing output Q t^. He will appropriate only a share 
Hence, the innovator’s average profits at time t are,
2.5 The innovator’s maximization problem
Innovators maximize their profits subject to their 'technology generating’ function. Their 
choice variable is the degree of IP protection z 2, and their state variable is A A  The in­
novator’s ‘technology generating’ function is given by A A tji = s t-i7rt-i,i +  Vi- Account­
ing though for equation (2.3), this equation becomes A A tti = +  Vi.
68 Hence, after a point, fierce competition reduces the number o f patents.
69 If one controls for firm effects by using bellow-firm-level data on R&D activity the inverted U relationship 
disappears, Scott (1993).
70 The assumption that e e  (0,1) is included so as to have z ~ x e  (0,1].
h,i =  Qt,i + -  eztA<j>tS -  e 1z t (2 .8)
7Tt.i =  ZtQt,i +  tz tAtpt (Pi — <5) — e 1zt (2.9)
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However, =  ezt} l9 allowing one to express the innovator’s ‘technology generating’ 
function as,
with initial condition A0,* =  A 0 —► 0+. Bearing in mind that the innovator is not aware 
of 6, (because even though the innovator is aware o f his Vi, he is not aware o f the v  that 
other innovators have until the race finishes) the innovator does not a priori know how 
good the research of any other innovator is, and how his research will spillover into his 
future innovations. Therefore, noting that Ep (v{) ^  0, the innovator must solve the above 
problem in expected terms. Accounting for equation (3.22), one can restate the innovator’s 
expected maximization problem as,
s.t. E A A tji = e z ^ A f a ^ n t - i j E S
Suppressing, henceforth, the expectations operator E  and allowing M  to be a large number, 
the steady state FOC can be expressed as,
innovator i. From the steady state solution, it is clear that increases in the size o f the
(2 .10)
In all, the innovator’s problem can be written down as,
max
S.t A A t ,i =  €Zt } l A<j)t _ l 8'Kt - \ , i  +  Vi
max*2
e8A(f)M
(2 .11)
where A </> is the steady state ‘social target’, and A Ai is the steady state innovation o f
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steady state ‘social target ', or in the size of the market, will cause a downward shift in z.
Contrary to that, increases in the size of the market which the other innovators occupy (i.e.
1 _  _
f  A Ajdj), will cause an increase in z.
o
The above discussion implies that markets where the technology progresses quickly71 
(i.e. the A 4> is big) should allow for a small degree of IP protection.72 This finding accords 
with Gort and Klepper’s study of technology product life cycles. Specifically, they find that 
most o f the firm’s patenting takes place in the latter stage o f its research and not during its 
early stages.73
2.6 When should RJVs be formed
In this section I will concentrate on deriving the conditions under which an RJV will be 
formed. I will work under the assumption that an RJV is a partnership between an innovator 
(a private firm) and a university. The objective o f the potential partners would be to benefit 
from the technological expertise that the other partner has, or alternatively to benefit from 
the profits that the other partner has.
In this model all innovators start from a very low starting point A 0 —> 0+, without 
any external finance. These innovators progressively develop their technology Ai by cre­
ating innovations A A i,  which they profit from. Hence, ceteris paribus the magnitude of
A Ai, when compared to the one that the other innovators create, depends on the innova­
71 The capacity o f the model to allow the innovator to choose a low degree o f IP protection when dealing 
with a fundamental technology, accords with the historical evidence offered by Rosenberg (1994), Mowery 
and Rosenberg (1989), and Nelson (1962), with respect to the invention o f the transistor.
i
72 For a detailed discussion of the effects of 8 and J  A  Aj d j  on the above equation see Panagopoulos (2003).
o
73 Gort and Klepper, (1982).
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tor’s ability v it see equation (2.1). Accordingly, the main factor determining how well an 
innovator preforms, and how big his profits are, is Vi.
This intuition suggests that, if one of the potential partners is lacking capital and 
wants to benefit from the profits of the other partner, in developing some technology, then 
there must be a mismatch in the individual ability o f each potential partner to innovate. 
Considering that it is irrational for a good innovator to jointly do research with a bad one, I 
will henceforth concentrate on the first objective -i.e. innovators and firms want to form an 
RJV to simultaneously benefit from the expertise that each other has.
In this context, the average profits of an innovator z, who has created, at time t, 
some innovation A A tji, are given by equation (2.9). These profits include the gains that 
the innovator makes from his innovation z^Q ^i,  as well as the cost ezt^A(f)ti (5 — p{) +  
e~lz t,iX ^ ’ where z ^  is the degree o f IP protection that the innovator would choose and 
A (f)t i depicts how fast A tfi is evolving. If an innovator forms an RJV with a university, the 
two partners must decide on how to split the gains and the cost. Assuming that they decide 
upon a simple form o f contact, one that attributes to each partner a set percentage 77x of 
the gains and r\2 o f the cost, their contract should be given by the following set, (rjl9 rj2), 
where iql 2 e  [0,1]. This being the case, the average profits 7r^ o f the innovator must be 
the following,
e 1c A A tjR
TTt,i — Vl Zt,RQt,R V2 Zt,R eA(Pt,R (5 ~  Pi) +
A(Pt,RS
where A A ^ r is the expected innovation that the RJV will create, QtjR is the demand for the 
good produced using A A ttR, z*R expresses the degree o f IP protection that the RJV will 
choose, while A(pt R expresses how fast A tfR is evolving.
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However, to the above profits one must include the opportunity cost o f the innovator. 
The opportunity cost o f the innovator will be the profits that he would forego, if  he chooses 
to stop working on his own technology A tji and starts working on the technology that the 
RJV will develop.74 This opportunity cost must be equal to,
Accounting for the above opportunity cost, the overall net profits of innovator i are given
Based on the above discussion and on equation (2.12), it is straight forward to derive a 
similar expression for the overall net profits of the university as well.
As expected, the above equation implies that the innovator (university) will base his 
decision, on whether to join an RJV, on the expected innovation A A ^ r that the RJV will 
create, as well as on the way that the partners will allocate both cost and gains i.e. (rjl9 rj2). 
However, I have shown in the above section, that z%R is case specific, and that it depends 
on how fast the technology evolves i.e. A</>. Thus, the innovator must also account for his 
choice of IP protection. Bearing the above in mind, one can show that the decision of the 
innovator and the university to form an RJV does not depend on the degree of the collective
magnitude o f innovations f  A Ajdj,  nor on the size o f the market M , but on A 0 (how fast
o
technology is evolving).
by,
(2 . 12)
74 I assume that the innovator will stop his research on A t ,i in order to avoid duplication. However, this 
assumption does not imply that he will choose to stop his entire research on this technology.
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Specifically, as the following proposition states, firms and universities that work on 
new technologies should find it easier to form an RJV. This result is derived under the 
assumption that universities are not different from firms, both in the way that they maximize 
profits, as well as in their research specialization; since they specialize in both new and 
‘mature ' technologies. If one is to make the more realistic assumption that universities 
specialize only on new technologies, then this result is reinforced.
Proposition 2 Universities and firms find it easier to form RJVs that specialize on new 
technologies.
Proof. See appendix one. ■
This proposition accords with the evidence offered by Hall, Link and Scott (2000, 
2001), who note that ‘universities are most likely to partner in new technological fields 
where R&D is closer to science ’,75 as well as Link and Vonortas (2002), who list the RJVs 
between EU firms and US universities. In detail, the data of Link and Vonortas, included 
in figure 2.2, shows that most RJVs take place in technical areas that one would consider 
as fast evolving science, such as telecommunications.
In reality, it is difficult to find which technical areas/industries can be considered as 
fast evolving science. One possible way is to find which industries are the most R&D 
intensive. Specifically, using the ISDB data set,76 the most R&D intensive industries are
75 The reason that the authors offer is that universities offer research awareness, i.e. a research insight that 
is anticipatory o f future research problems and could be an obudsman anticipating and translating to all the 
complex nature o f the research being undertaken.
76 This is an OECD data set that records, among other things, R&D expenditures per 3 digit industry; which 
means that it does not fully cover all the technical areas listed in figure 2.2.
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(intensity is defined as R&D spending per worker and is included in parenthesis next to the 
industry): transportation (1), computers (2), and telecommunications (3).
Another possible way is to find which industries are the most patent intensive (patent 
intensity is used to express the number of patents that are granted per year and it is listed in 
parenthesis next to the industry). In this case, using the US statistical abstract one can find 
that telecommunications/electronics (1), transportation (2) and chemicals (3) are the most 
patent intensive industries.
From the above, even though there is no doubt that my analysis just touches on this 
very interesting issue, a pattern emerges which suggest that telecommunications, com­
puters, transportation and chemicals can be considered as technical areas/industries that 
use fast evolving science. All these industries (along with energy/environmental technolo­
gies77) are in the top of figure 2.2, having the majority of RJVs between EU firms and US 
universities.
In conclusion, such a line o f approach indicates that firms which face a lower op­
portunity cost are the ones most likely to form an RJV. Hence, large firms (ones operating 
many different projects at the same time, some o f which should be on new-technologies) 
and firms with financial resources (who don’t care about the opportunity cost that much), 
would be the most likely candidates for such projects. The evidence offered by Caloghirou, 
Vonortas and Tsakanikas (2000), pointing to the fact that firms that sell by average over 1
77 The ISDB data set has no records on the R&D spending for the energy and environmental industries. This 
is because o f the ISIC code listing that ISDB uses which includes the above two industries in other industry 
listings. There is a similar problem with the data included in the US statistical abstracts.
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billion Euros tend to cooperate much more with universities than firms who sell less, seems 
to offer support for the view expressed above.
2.7 Conclusion
In order to regenerate the country’s R&D activity, which it was feared to be lagging behind 
that of Japan, the US Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act allowing universities to patent 
their innovations more easily than before. However, the increase in RJVs between firms and 
universities, initiated by the Bayh-Dole Act, is not as significant as expected. This chapter 
studies the reasons why firms and universities find it difficult to form RJVs, stressing the 
role of IP protection.
In its decision to form an RJV or not, a firm (and a university) has to make a choice 
between continuing to work along its own line o f research, or to jointly develop a technol­
ogy with a university. The choice of the firm will depend on how big its opportunity cost 
will be. As this chapter shows, firms which already do research on new-technologies (i.e. 
technologies that are closer to science and are not yet ‘mature ’ and well-developed), have 
a lower opportunity cost, hence they are the most likely participants of such RJVs.
The explanation of this thesis is premised on the importance of IP protection. Specifi­
cally, as firms (and universities) choose their preferential degree o f IP protection in a market 
where firms licence their innovations to competitors, IP protection proves to be case spe­
cific. In particular, the degree o f IP protection chosen by the firm will depend on how fast 
the technology evolves. In this framework, if  the technology is new (fast evolving and 
closer to science), the firm will choose to share it, choosing to have a low degree of IP pro­
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tection. Hence, the profits of the firm will be lower than those of a firm developing a slow 
moving, but ‘mature ', technology.
The intuition behind the firm’s choice rests on the increased knowledge spillovers 
from which the firm will gain, if  it chooses a low degree o f IP protection on a technology 
that is not yet well-developed to create ‘quality ’ goods. Thereby, the opportunity cost for a 
firm that specializes on ‘mature ’ and well-understood technologies will be greater than the 
one of a firm specializing on new-technologies.
Essential to the above argument is the assumption that firms make similar choices re­
garding their preferred degree of IP protection. In addition, I have allowed innovation to be 
partly driven by an exogenous parameter whose aim is to represent ability. These simpli­
fications have greatly aided in simplifying the model but leave room for further research, 
hopefully in a model in which IP protection will be non-cooperative.
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2.A Appendix one
In this proof I will concentrate on finding the profits of the innovator (a private firm) and the 
university, when joining an RJV. Since, by joining the RJV the innovator (university) enters 
into a contract which specifies how the cost and the profits are split, I will concentrate this 
proof on the best case scenario for the innovator and the university, and afterwards offer a 
proof for the more general case. Initially, I will concentrate on the innovator and then on 
the university.
The most preferable outcome for the innovator is the one where the innovator ap­
propriates all the gains, while the university all the cost. Symmetrically, the worst case 
scenario is the one where the innovator appropriates all the cost, making negative profits; 
and thus decides to abstain from any RJV. Specifically, equation (2.12) shows that in order 
for a innovator to find it profitable to participate in an RJV, the following inequality must 
apply,
7l z t , f lQ t,R  — 72 z t,R e A (Pt,R (<S~Pi) +
e c A A tjR
>
^ %t,i (£ -  Pi) +  €
-ic A A t/
A <M _
(2.13)
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Allowing the economy to be on a steady state, and substituting equations (2.11), (2.5), in 
the above inequality, one can re-express equation (2.13) as,
Vi (  1 [  A A jd j  ] f A A "
I  A A jd j
- V i  ■
1 +  C
I eSA(f)RM
A A jd j eA(pR (<5 -  pi) +  e
_j cA A R
A  <f>R5
>
l + c 
e S A ^ M
l +  c
eSA & M
A A jd j
A A jd j
M A A i
f  A A jd j
eA & (<5 -  +  e
_ xc A A {
A ^ S
(2.14)
Allowing for A A R =  A Ai  implying that the innovator will not suffer from a decrease in 
demand if  he forms an RJV, the most profitable scenario for the innovator is the one where 
j)l =  1, and r]2 = 0. This means that, by joining the RJV, the innovator gets all the gains 
from this new technology, without incurring any o f the cost. If this scenario is true than the 
above inequality can be expressed as,
l  +  c
eSA(f)RM
A A jd j
M A A r
I  A A jd j
0
>
l  +  c
A Ajdj
M A A i
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Canceling out equal terms and rearranging, it is straight forward to derive the following 
inequality,
1 ( t 2A4>j5 (S - Pi) | t A /  A 4>r  -  A4>{ ^  ^
c +  1 \  A A i j  \  A<j>R
Apparently, the right hand side of equation (2.15) displays the percentage difference
between A<j)R and A0,. If  this difference is either zero, or negative, this inequality will
always apply. Subsequently, equation (2.15) shows that the innovator’s decision does not
i
depend on the degree of market concentration f  A A jd j ,  nor on the size of the market M.
o
It only depends on
A (j)R -  A0-
A 4>r
i.e. how fast does the RJV’s technology evolves, compared to the technology that the 
innovator is working on. This inequality will always be satisfied if  A <j>i
Cancelling out the assumption o f the best case scenario, where rf1 =  1 and t?2 =  0, 
allowing though for symmetry A A r = A A i,  the inequality included in equation (2.14) 
becomes,
(6  -  p >) ( ! - * ) & &  +  (1  +  c h i  > A A  / A A _- V c A t \  (2  ( 6 )
5 V A 0, )
In order for this inequality to always hold the following must be true, A ^  Bearing
in mind that (t]2, c) < 1, this expression suggests that A 4>i must be much greater than 
A <fiR. This implies that an innovator will find it profitable to form an RJV if  he is working
 2 AJ,2
on a new technology for which A (ji >
Up to now I have concentrated on what determines the decision o f the firm. Accord­
ingly, I have excluded universities from the decision process. In what follows, I will apply
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the rationale developed above in order to find what factors determine the university’s de­
cision to join an RJV. In a manner similar to the above proof, I will allow a university to 
have an opportunity cost. Forming the university’s problem in a fashion similar to equation 
(2.14), it is easy to derive that in the steady the following inequality must apply,
where the subscript u, indicating a university, has taken the place o f the subscript i, which 
indicated the innovator. Similarly, for this inequality to always hold the following must be
to form an RJV. This inequality should generally be true for a large enough A <j)u i.e. for 
new technologies.
In conclusion, innovators that work on new technologies should find it easier to fulfill 
equation (2.17) and form an RJV with a university, in addition the same is true for univer­
sities. Therefore, one should expect universities and firms to find it easier to cooperate if 
they are both working on a new technology.
If one is to assume that universities specialize on new technologies, see Beath et al. 
(2001) for a similar assumption, then the above proposition will still apply. This is because 
universities, since they already work on new technologies, have a low opportunity cost. 
Using equation (2.17), It is straight forward to show that a low opportunity cost as such 
will make universities eager to participate in an RJV that concentrates on both new and 
‘mature ’ technologies.
This is because the right hand side of equation (2.17) is negative, thus the inequality 
expressed through equation (2.17) always holds. On the other hand, as I have already
e25 (S — pu) (1 — 7j2)A(f)R 
A A u
+  ( l+ c )r ]1 > (2.17)
true, A (f?u > Thereby, if  A 0U > is true, a university will always find it profitable
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explained, only innovators that incur a low opportunity cost will choose to join an RJV, and 
these innovators are ones that work on new technologies. Thus, if  an RJV is to be formed, 
it will specialize on new technologies.
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Fig. 3.2. This figure includes the number o f  RJVs between EU firms and US universities, Link and Vonortas (2002).
Chapter 3 
Patent Protection as a Stimulant for Risky 
Innovation
3.1 Introduction
The idea that a competitor’s breath behind one’s back forces tournament contestants to 
adopt riskier strategies is not a new one. It goes back to Harris and Vickers (1987) and 
Beath, Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989). Nevertheless, this idea has not yet found its way into 
the intellectual property protection literature, eventhough there is a well known historic 
precedent that displays how lack o f competition can lead an innovator to rest on his laurels. 
Specifically, in the 1890s Edison successfully patented his light-bulb filament invention; 
however, until the patent expired, General Electric did not improve on this technology. In 
addition, even though other companies had created a better light bulb, General Electric 
managed (through successful litigation) to keep competitors out o f the market, increasing 
its market share and sales.
In the light o f the above argument, this chapter is based on a tournament between 
two competing innovating firms, where an innovation is a twofold process, based on prior 
art and risky experimentation. These two firms innovate sequentially and the winner is the 
only firm to put its innovation into production. The variable o f choice for the firm is the 
amount o f R&D effort that will be diverted to risky research paths, i.e. research that can 
lead to breakthroughs, as well as pitfalls. The production side o f the economy is a simple
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growth framework based on Aghion and Howitt (1992). Within this context, the role of a 
central planner (who acts on behalf of the courts and the PTO) is to maximize production, 
using patent breadth as his choice variable. Patent breadth is indicated by how much the 
losing firm can copy (within the boundaries of legal protection) the winner’s innovation. 
Overall, if  the loser can fully copy the winner then they both have a similar technology at 
hand, which indicates that there is more competition between them during the tournament. 
Patent breath in this model is best captured by the number o f patent claims allowed by the 
PTO, as well as the courts’ attitude towards infringement.
The literature connecting growth theory to intellectual property is rather slim, see 
Gallini (2002) for a survey. A notable exception, from a theoretical point of view, is 
Horowitz and Lai (1996) who show that there is an inverted U relationship between the 
rate of innovation and patent length. The argument that they present is that an increase in 
patent length leads to larger, but less frequent, innovations. Moreover, from an empirical 
perspective, Lemer (2004), in an international analysis o f the relationship between patent 
strength and innovation, examines 177 policy shifts in 60 countries over 150 years and finds 
some support for a non linear relationship.
Notwithstanding the above, when one is working on tournaments, in which innova­
tors innovate in a specific technology, he must be careful when addressing the nature of the 
technology in use and the ability o f the innovator, because sometimes the above-mentioned 
idea may not be applicable. For example, certain firms (economies) may not be in a posi­
tion to successfully incorporate more risk into their innovating effort. By the same token, 
some technologies, such as the internal combustion engine, or sailing ship technology, are
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understood to have reached the end o f their evolution, contrasting new technological para­
digms, such as biotechnology. For the latter technologies the adaptation of risky innovation 
strategies may lead to unexpected results, while risky strategies in the former give relatively 
foreseeable results.
Overall, the aim of this chapter is to study optimal patent breadth, the one that max­
imizes production. As this chapter shows, there is an increasing relationship between how 
strong the optimal patent protection should be (patent breadth) and the ability of the econ­
omy (firm) to successfully follow risky innovation strategies. In an analogous fashion, new 
technological paradigms may require stricter protection compared to more mature tech­
nologies, where risky innovation paths may prove less productive. Bearing in mind that 
developing economies lack the capacity to successfully follow risky innovation strategies, 
this finding suggests that developing economies should adopt a more lenient intellectual 
property policy, compared to the ones followed by more advanced economies.
The notion o f patent breadth differs from the ones used in the literature. For example, 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) suggest that a greater breadth is one that increases the flow rate 
of the innovator’s profits, while Klemperer (1990) concentrates on the quality advantage of 
the patent holder. In addition, Gallini’s definition, Gallini (1992), is one involving the cost 
of imitation, while Green and Scotchmer (1995) focus on the division of profits. In broad 
terms the definition o f patent breadth suggested here is closer to Matutes, Regibeau and 
Rockett (1996), who also concentrate on new technological paradigms.
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This chapter is not the only one examining patent breadth in the context o f a tourna­
ment.78 Tournaments have also been studied by Denicolo (2000 and 1996). However, the 
emphasis here is on the patent breadth that maximizes output. Therefore, the model dis­
tances itself from Denicolo (2000), Chang (1995), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer 
(1990) and Nordhaus (1969) who concentrate on social welfare.
This model is not without its limitations. Specifically, to simplify the analysis the 
model considers a static problem. Therefore, it cannot shed light on issues such as leading 
and lagging breadth, as in O ’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998). Moreover, the 
model examines only patent breadth and it does not allow for a discussion on patent length. 
Such a simplification allows for results that are less prone to interpretation. Furthermore, 
the treatment of risk is effectively the simplest possible, hence there is no varying degree 
of risk. In addition, following a risky innovation path does not carry an extra cost. These 
essential complications are unfortunately left out for future research.
In what follows, sections 3.2-3.3 introduce the model, section 3.4 elaborates on the 
ways patents foster innovation, while section 3.5 derives the optimal patent protection.
3.2 Introducing the general framework
In this section I will first sketch out the benchmark model, as well as the main assumptions 
that accompany the growth model that is to follow, and then I will outline the model’s 
main assumptions on how an innovation is created. Specifically, the model o f Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) (explained in detail in Appendix one) is a model of endogenous growth,
78 For a review o f tournament models see Reinganum (1989).
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where innovations arrive stochastically. In this model, similar to most endogenous growth 
models, innovations are created in a monopolistic environment (protected by a patent), 
while the final product is produced in a perfectly competitive environment. This patent- 
based protection is shared by most endogenous growth models, making this general type 
of models better suited for the study o f patents and economic growth.
One of the main characteristics o f the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model is that an 
arriving innovation replaces the old one with certainty. Hence, the model captures the 
Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction, contrasting other endogenous growth mod­
els, such as the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model, where an innovation is a creative 
step that builds on all the existing prior art. Another important element of the Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) model is that it implicitly introduces a patent race framework in the way it 
derives the amount of labour devoted to research. One o f the many insights offered by this 
model is that in the steady state the average growth rate o f the economy depends on the 
number of research workers that the economy has.
Accounting for the above, the creative destruction that Aghion and Howitt introduce 
makes their model better suited for the present research. This is because this model already 
incorporates a limited time span for an innovation, similar to the limited time span that 
patents have. Segerstrom et al. (1990), also account for creative destruction. However, 
their framework is basically a North-South model o f trade, unfit for the quality ladder 
framework that follows.
With the above in mind, I will assume two innovating firms i, j  that operate in an 
economy with no credit markets. These two firms have full information about each other.
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This economy is inhibited by a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals, with identical in­
tertemporal additive preferences defined over lifetime consumption and a constant rate of 
time preference r >  0. Furthermore, only three classes of tradeable objects exist. The first 
one is labour, the second one is a consumption good and the third one is an intermediate 
good. Assuming no disutility from supplying labour, there is one category of labour (ex­
cluding the innovating firm, which can also be assumed as a an innovator), unskilled labour 
x. Unskilled labour can be used in the production o f the intermediate good and as a pro­
ducer of the final consumption good. Unskilled workers are all equipped with one unit of 
labour.
Innovating firms and production workers split the profits and, since no credit market 
exists, unskilled workers consume their wage at each instant. Specifically, the innovating 
firm keeps a set fraction 1 — e o f the profits, e G (0,1), while production workers receive the 
remaining e. This fraction will be assumed to be exogenous. This exogeneity is introduced 
for two reasons. First, production workers and innovators (innovating firms) do not have 
the same skills, thus they are not homogeneous. Therefore, it is difficult to justify a labour 
market condition where, similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992), both parties receive the 
same wage, which is based on the value o f the innovation. In addition, if  one introduces 
a similar labour market condition making it endogenous to the model’s main variable of 
interest (the patent breadth), then the results o f the chapter would be introduced via the 
labour market, when, as far as I know, there is no empirical data in support of such an 
argument. Nevertheless, one can assume, similar to Jones (2001), that the greater patent 
breadth is the greater the monopoly power that the innovator enjoys, which increases his
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bargaining power and his share o f the profits. Hence, e could be endogenous on patent 
breadth. However, introducing the above argument in the model does not alter the model’s 
final results and formulas. Thus, I will allow e to be exogenous.
As regards to innovation, firms carry out research programs that result in a sequence 
of innovations. Each innovation is drastic and it consists o f the invention o f a new inter­
mediate good, which is produced using x  unskilled workers. The use o f the intermediate 
good as an input allows more efficient methods to be used in producing a consumption 
good. However, only one firm will produce an intermediate good, with a tournament be­
ing the mechanism that determines which one. The intermediate good that the winner of 
the tournament produces will increase technology A by a factor o f A A  This means that 
technology is sequential in nature. Thus, technology A  is the sum of all past innovations 
£ A A
In this framework, with certainty only one innovation will be developed every period 
t,79 where t also corresponds to the ranking o f each innovation. In view of the above, one 
tournament will take place every period. The winner o f each tournament, the firm that has 
the greater A, will be a monopolist since it will be the only one whose intermediate good 
will be used in producing the final consumption good. Since innovations and tournaments 
must coincide, the index t will also be used to indicate the ranking of tournaments and of 
winners.
The model assumes that the winning firm patents its innovation and does not licence 
it. If the firm does not patent its innovation, since there is full information, the rival firm will
79 This assumption accords with the evidence offered by Panagopoulos (2004).
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be able to appropriate it. This patent, along with the intermediate good, will be employed 
by the firm in production, where production takes place in a perfectly competitive market 
(alternatively one can assume that the innovating firm sells its patent to a producer who 
operates in a perfectly competitive environment). The time span o f the patent is assumed 
to be at least one period long.
If the winner of tournament t  is i, then i will create an innovation that increases its 
past technology A t- is» by A A t)i. The firm that failed to win, the follower j ,  will not be 
able to use A A t^. This is because the patent o f the winner on A A t^ does not allow such 
use. However, j  can re-innovate around A A t^. This means that j  can legally bypass some 
aspect of the winner’s technology and by doing so it can legally develop some technology 
of its own. This re-innovating will take place during the t +  1 tournament. In this context, 
j  will be able to advance its past technology A - i j  by m ax (A A tj ,  AAA*,;}, where A e  
[0,1] indicates how much re-innovating around A A t}i the follower can do.80 Therefore, the 
technology of j  at time t is,
A tfj = A t- i tj +  max {A A t J , AAA*,*} (3.18)
Accounting for the above, 1 — A can be considered as patent breath. For example, 
if A is zero then the follower cannot re-innovate around the innovation o f the winner. On 
the contrary, if  A is one then the follower can fully re-innovate around. This means that the 
follower will end up with an innovation that is of equal size to that of the winner.
i0 US law has an experimentation exemption. However, here the winning innovation leads directly to a final
product. Therefore, any re-innovation will translate itself in a commercial product and this is prohibited.
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The model’s time-line is the following. Every period a tournament t takes place dur­
ing which i, j  create an innovation in the form of an intermediate input. All research 
oriented decisions (such as what type of research path to follow) will be taken during the 
tournament. After the tournament, the winner uses its technology in producing the con­
sumption good.
3.3 Innovations
In this section I will model innovation as an ongoing twofold process. On the one hand an 
innovation will be the result o f research that is based on prior art. This type of research 
should create an innovation o f expected magnitude since it is the creation o f techniques 
whose potential and limitations must be well understood. On the other hand, an innovation 
can be the result o f experimentation. When one experiments he is working on the frontier 
of science where prior art is seldom in existence. Due to the lack o f prior art and the 
absence of a full understanding of the potential of technologies on the frontier of science, 
the outcome of this research is uncertain.81 Henceforth, I will use the term fundamental 
research to describe the research that takes place in such a situation.
An example o f an innovation, which in its development involved fundamental re­
search, is the invention o f the transistor by Bell Laboratories in 1947. The aim of this re­
search was to create a better electron emitting diode, one that was superior to the traditional 
‘bulbs ’ that were in use at the time. From its start, Bell Laboratories had two choices, to 
either continue working on the traditional diode and try to improve it. Or, alternatively, try
81 For a discussion on the uncertainty surrounding innovation see Rosenberg (1996).
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and concentrate on an entirely new line of physics, namely solid-state physics. Solid-state 
physics, had only been introduced in the graduate curriculum of the top US universities in 
the mid 1930s and at the time there was little understanding (and a lot of uncertainty) in­
volved around its potential. Therefore, solid-state physics was a research path that could 
have provided a dead end result. Successful, as it turned out to be, it led to applications that 
at the time where beyond the imagination of the creators o f the transistor.82
However, in addition to the work that Bell carried out on solid-state physics applica­
tions, a great deal of the research that led to the invention o f the transistor was supplemented 
by the use of well understood technologies. For example, in order to put theory into use 
Bell had to work on well known metallurgy technologies, which were needed in order to 
create the silicon sandwich material in which the transistor is bonded into.83
Accounting for the above, firm i has a choice on the way it uses its research effort 
(e.g. the time spent on research during tournaments) which for simplicity is normalized to 
one for both i and j .  On the one hand, i can choose to work on a research path that uses 
traditional methods and techniques, which generate a fully expected and linear-increasing 
innovation. Alternatively, it has the choice to work on a research path that uses fundamental 
research (suggesting that results can vary both upwards and downwards and thus the nature 
of the resulting innovation is unforeseen). Accordingly, i splits its research effort between
82 The transistor was, at the time, perceived as an innovation with limited potential. In fact, Bell was initially 
hesitant on applying for a patent.
83 Many o f the subsequent improvements on the transistor, even to this day, have been based on improving 
this sandwich so that it allows less current to pass through, while permitting finer and more even transistors 
to be manufactured.
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the two different research paths, spending crM <G (0,1) in the latter research path and (1 -  
crt,i) in the former.
As indicated above a t,i ^  1- This is because even for the most novel innovations one 
must make use of prior art by using tools and techniques developed in the past (traditional 
methods). In addition, <jt,i > 0- This assumption accords with everyday experience, which 
suggests that some experimentation is always needed and cannot be avoided.
As regards the linear part o f the innovation, the productivity o f research is set as 
7  > 0. Thus, if during tournament t firm i uses (1 — a t,i) o f its research effort on traditional 
techniques, there will be a linear set increase (1 — a t,i)7 in the magnitude of technology 
A tii. This increase in innovative capability is attributed to learning by doing and the knowl­
edge spillovers generated by other technologies. Since the research o f j  must also spillover 
to i, one should express 7 as a function o f A tj .  However, Pakes and Schankerman (1979), 
suggest that knowledge does not spillover spontaneously and that research takes 2-3 years 
to spillover. On account o f this considerable time lag, noting that both firms have full in­
formation about each other and operate under the same patent system (revealing the details 
of all new innovations) I will treat 7  as an exogenous parameter that is common for both 
firms.
Overall, 7  is designed to capture the economy’s increase in research productivity that 
does not result from fundamental research. I f  one is to provide a historical example, 7  
can account for the overwhelming increase in efficiency o f the methods used to built the 
Liberty ship during WWII. This shipbuilding project was carried out in many different US
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shipyards, owned by different firms, over a four year period, under the guidance/control of 
the US ministry of defence, see Thorton and Thompson (2000).
Adding to the linear increase described above, there will be an innovation o f mag­
nitude crt,iVi, where v% is distributed having an exogenously given mean /ii >  0. This 
innovation is the result o f fundamental research. In this model ^  expresses the ability of i 
to successfully carry out fundamental research.
In total, the innovation created by i is given by,
A A t,i = (1 -  ctm)7 +  a t,iVi
having an initial value o f AAt=0,i >  0. The above formulation treats (1 — <7^)7  and 
<rt,iVi as perfect substitutes. In reality, (1 — <7 ^)7  is the expected part o f an innovation 
and a t)iVi is the unexpected part. However, since i has a choice to employ or not in its 
research some a priori unexpected research path, it is irrational for i to contact its research 
mainly using a t,%Vi. This is because, as the above intuition implies, a t,iVi can attain negative 
values as well. Subsequently, if  i chooses to follow a high o  strategy it might end up with 
an innovation A A tj  which is less than expected. On account o f the above, the expected 
innovation should be,
E A A t^  —  7 +  (3.19)
where M x — iii — 7  and E  is the expectations operator. Since >  0, 7  > 0 and o t,i C 
(0, 1), E A A tj  should be greater than zero.
In the light o f the above, if  i has a ^  that is equal to zero then Vs expected innovation 
is E A A t i^ =  (1 — 0t,i)7f- Contrary to that, if  i has the capacity to follow a research strategy
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where a  >  0 and, on average, derive some positive innovation, then it will have a fa that is 
greater than zero. Thus, i is expected to create an innovation that is greater than (1 - 07^)7 .84
Since Vi can attain negative values it is possible for A A t,i to be less than zero. If  this 
turns out to be true, it implies that research has followed the wrong path. In this case, the 
firm will make use of the technology that it has developed up to tournament t — l .85 Similar 
to chapter two, an example of a technology that did not generate the expected results would 
be the High Definition TV (HDTV). In the late 1980’s this was a promising European 
TV standard that turned out to be costly and outdated (when compared to the USA TV 
technology of its time).86
Accounting for the above discussion, one should ask the following question. Is there 
any reason to believe that • can be greater than 7  (the set rate o f technological change)? 
One can think of the following two situations where the above is plausible. If the firm has 
advanced fundamental research capabilities, which allows it to successfully use new and 
not well understood techniques, or if  the technology is a new technological paradigm. In 
the latter case 7  must be small because there is no prior learning and no prior experience in 
the form of knowledge spillovers. For example, computers in the early 1950’s were a brand 
new technological paradigm on which the use o f prior art had limited effects. Therefore,
84 In view o f the Bell Laboratories example, Bell was employing some o f the best US scientists (and some 
later Nobel price winners) and made a lot o f effort to diffuse the knowledge created by US universities in its 
research program. Thus, one can allow Bell to have a fi that is higher than the /i o f a firm for which the above 
do not apply.
85 Hence, equation (3.18) must be re-expressed as, A tj  — A t~ i j  +  max {0, A A tj , \ A A t>i}.
86 In 1991 the European Commission, in an initiative that was backed up by various satellite interests, 
proposed an expensive plan, which was worth o f  850 million Euro, to support the HDTV standard plan. 
There was considerable debate in the Council about the budget, but finally the issue was dropped, with the 
justification being that a more advanced technology was already available in the US. For a detailed discussion 
of the HDTV project see Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
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one could not base his research on already established research paths. On the contrary, one 
had to experiment with new tools and ideas on which there was limited prior knowledge 
and understanding.
I have up to now created two quality ladders that correspond to two different compet­
ing firms. As it will become apparent in the following section, competition in this frame­
work will depend on the distance that separates the technologies created by the two com­
petitors. If the two quality ladders are o f dissimilar magnitude, since there is a clearly 
defined leader (the firm with the higher A), there is limited competition. Symmetrically, if 
the two quality ladders are of similar magnitude there exists competition. This is because 
z, j  are close enough to be able to leapfrog each other. Accordingly, the closer z, j  get the 
easier it will be for z, j  to leapfrog each other. In this context, one way o f increasing com­
petition is to increase A, making it easier for the follower to re-innovate around the leader’s 
technology. This way, the follower will increase its technology getting closer to the leader.
3.4 Solving the model
Every firm has an expected probability E p tti o f winning tournament t, where E ptji e  
(0, 1). Since this section will concentrate on a static problem the subscript t will be omit­
ted. In addition, I will assume that Epi does not become either one or zero, thereby the 
duopolistic structure o f the tournament never deteriorates to a monopoly.87 Epi expresses 
the expected probability that z has o f creating a technology that is greater than the one cre­
ated by j ,  i.e. Epi (A{ > A j). This line o f reasoning suggests that the greater EA{ is, the
87 This should always be true if  A A t=o,i ~  A A t= o j .
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more likely it will be for i to win the tournament. On the contrary, if  j  has a large E A j,  it 
will decrease the chances that i has o f winning. Therefore, for Epi (A ^ A j ),
dEpi dEpi
S >0’a 4 <0' (3 -20)
where for simplicity I am making the assumption that all cross derivatives and second or­
der derivatives are small enough to be effectively considered as zero. Nevertheless, one 
can suggest that dEA'f < which implies that, as E A i increases, probability Epi will in­
crease with a diminishing rate o f increase. This could be the result of knowledge spillovers. 
Specifically, having allowed for knowledge spillovers, the greater E A i is the more the 
knowledge spillovers available to j .  This means that as E A i  increases it will increase 7 , 
leading to an increase in E A j,  which should negatively affect Epi. However, as I noted 
in the previous section, Pakes and Schankerman (1979) find that spillovers diffuse slowly. 
Therefore, one can allow for —*► 0.
The consumption good is produced in the following fashion,
y  =  A lXa a e  (0,1) (3.21)
where the subscript i in y and x  has been omitted because there is always only one winner. 
Similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992), the producer’s profits are,
7Ti — aAiXa — w x  —cx
where c >  0 is the production cost per unit x  o f the intermediate input (which is produced 
by x  production workers all equipped with one unit o f labour). Production workers x
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receive a set fraction of the profits 677, i.e. w = Thus,
aA<;xa — cx (3.22)
1 +  6
The winner will maximize its profits 7r* subject to x. This maximization problem has the 
following FOC,
X =  | — )  (3.23)
c
Since the firm must choose its cr at the beginning o f the tournament, before its innovation 
is materialized, firms solve the following problem,
m & xE pi  (Ai, A j )  Ei i i
<?i
Using equations (3.22)-(3.23) the FOC from this maximization is given by the following 
implicit function,
F  (*<) =  +  F P i ^ -  = 0 (3-24)OGi 0(Ji
Bearing in mind that <  0, using the implicit function theorem on equation (3.24), the 
following condition is derived,
n  9 E Pi
d° '  6EA' (3.25)
d E A j A/f ( 9 dEpi I Q Epi \
\ * d E A i  ^  1 - a E A i )
In equation (3.25), is always greater than zero if Mi > 0, which suggests that, if 
l±i >  7 ,  the greater the expected technology o f firm j  is the greater the choice o f Oi for firm 
i will be.
Overall, the above discussion allows one to concentrate on the following question, 
how will the leader respond to an increase in Ap. As it turns out, if  fi{ >  7 any increase in 
E A j  should ceteris paribus lead i to respond by adopting a greater In a similar fashion, 
if  fij > 7 ,  when the follower j  faces the leader’s higher technology, it must also adopt a
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greater ctj in its innovation process; because >  0. The above intuition implies that 
if  between two tournaments there is an increase in A, which leads to more competition, 
then there will be an increase in a. As a result, considering that E A A i  =  7  +  cj- — 7 ) ,  
if  /?• >  7 ,  increases in A lead to a greater a, a greater expected innovation and a greater 
expected technology EA i.
3.5 The optimal patent protection
The objective of a central planner is to maximize expected output y with respect to A. 
Accordingly, the central planner’s maximization problem is,
m axi??/ =  EAiXt
Accounting for equations (3.19), (3.23) and (3.25), the FOC is,
dEPi p  A A ( a2EAi \  1 a ( I | 1 c \
Q  ^ ------------------------------------------------- = 0 <3-26)
z  d E A i  1 - a  E A i
Having at hand a suitable function for p  one can solve the above implicit function for A. 
Nevertheless, even in the absence o f such a function an important result can be reached.
Specifically, using the implicit function theorem on equation (3.26),
h z Z r r  E A  ( 2  - ? Pi -I —— (  1 EAA^c 2
d X  _  a \ f d E A i  ^  1 - a  E A i )  (  (1 - a )  a E A \
d M i ~  §§f .E & A i  +  a ( I - a )  E A t +  c
Since < 0, this function is always less than zero if  >  7 .
What does the above inequality imply in terms o f optimal patent breadth? Bearing 
in mind that a greater A implies that more re-innovation can take place, the above result 
suggest that if  the firm has advanced research capabilities allowing ^  > >  7  (or altema-
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tively, if  the technology involved is that o f a new technological paradigm) it requires greater 
patent protection compared to a firm for which yu • > 7 .  Notwithstanding the above, and in 
the context o f the economy as a whole, is an institutional parameter expressing not only 
the ability of i to foster fundamental research, but the ability o f the economy in which the 
firm operates as well. This is because i is the tournament’s winner. Thus, by definition 
represents the whole economy, because i is the only firm producing (one can think o f i as 
a national champion). Using such an interpretation for one can suggest that different 
economies may require a different intellectual property protection policies because their 
ability to foster fundamental research varies. In other words, different national systems of 
innovation (NSIs)88 may require different intellectual property protection policies.
Against this background, an example o f the approach that different NSIs follow when 
innovating may be educational. Accordingly, if  one is to make a general comparison be­
tween the US NSI and the European one,89 eventhough there is no doubt that each NSI has 
its strong points,90 there is a general consensus that the US system is better suited to pro­
mote fundamental research. As Goyer (2001) notes, ‘By contrast [to the German system of 
innovation], the American system.... is well suited fo r  radical innovation, which requires 
the introduction o f  radical innovative design and rapid development based on pure scien­
88 There is a growing literature that examines the differences between various NSIs, see Nelson (1992), 
Mowery and Rosenberg, (1998). This literature suggests that different NSIs employ state, university, labora­
tory and firm research in different ways. In fact, as Soskice (1999) notes, the most important elements o f this 
framework are, the corporate governance system, the financial system, the industrial relations/worker train­
ing system, the education system, the organization o f employer associations and the relations among firms. 
How countries employ the above elements affects their ability to innovate and the type o f innovation they can 
produce.
89 Which is broadly comprised by three independent and different national systems, the French, the German 
and the UK one.
90 In the US the firm in cooperation with universities is central to research, while in European NSIs the state 
has a larger role to play
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tific research ’. This difference is highlighted in the different research paths US and German 
firms follow in the field of biotechnology. Specifically, German firms follow a low-risk in­
novation strategy, concentrating on proteins whose therapeutic properties are already well 
established. In contrast, the US firms, as Henderson et al. (1999) note, have used biotech­
nology as a search technique and their primary focus is on the discovery o f small molecules 
designed to increase the productivity o f synthetic drugs. Therefore, the above framework 
suggests that Germany may find it optimal to allow for a less strict patent protection in or­
der to stimulate (through greater competition) its firms to produce greater innovations and 
greater output.
3.6 Conclusions
In the 1990s a large part o f the intellectual property literature concentrated on the trade-off 
between patent breadth and patent length. The main argument used was that greater patent 
breadth gives the innovator more protection from imitators (which acts as an incentive to 
innovate) at the cost o f offering monopolistic rights to the innovator. However, as Scotch- 
mer (1991) noted, if  innovation is sequential, as it frequently is, then the patent holder can 
block all other innovators from employing his patent in the future. Subsequently, unless 
cross-licensed, patents can decrease competition between innovators (competition for the 
next innovation), allowing only the patent holder to use the latest technology in developing 
a better one.
Working within the context o f a patent race, this model concentrates on patent- 
induced lack of competition when innovation is sequential. The view that this model takes
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is that the resulting lack of competition can be detrimental for innovation, because it leads 
innovators to rest on their laurels and abstain from pursuing imiovation strategies that can 
potentially lead to radical innovations.
Specifically, there is a large literature that points to the excessive risk that competitive 
tournaments can lead to.91 In the context of a patent race, bearing in mind that innovation is 
a twofold process, which (in general) relies on the use o f both prior art and experimentation, 
risky experiments can potentially lead to radical innovations, such as the transistor, or to 
dead end results. The success, or not, o f experiments largely rests on the quality of research. 
One should expect that innovators that operate on the edge o f the technology frontier, have 
high quality researchers and allow for links with universities and laboratories, must be 
better equipped to successfully handle risky experiments, compared with ones that don’t. 
Such innovators can benefit from the risk involved in competitive patent races and through 
successful experimentation can create radical innovations.
Accounting for the above, this chapter’s main result is that, for economies with an 
advanced ability to perform research, or in the presence o f a new technological paradigm, 
there is a positive relationship between the economy’s ability to innovate and the optimal 
patent protection, the one that maximizes production.
Appendix one
In the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model the economy is populated by a continuous 
mass L  o f individuals with linear preferences. Output o f the consumption good depends on 
an intermediate input x  (the intermediate good accounts for technological change) accord­
91 See Harris and Vickers (1987), as well as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
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ing to,
y = A x a , a  £ (0 , 1)
while each innovation raises the technology parameter A  by the constant factor 7 .  In this 
economy there is no population growth, and workers can only use their labour either in 
research (research workers are denoted by n), or in production. Production workers are 
endowed with one unit o f labour, hence x  units of the intermediate input require x workers. 
This suggests that
L  =  x  +  n
In this economy innovations arrive with a Poisson arrival rate of An > 0, where A indi­
cates the productivity of research. The firm that succeeds in innovating monopolises the 
intermediate sector market until replaced by the next innovator.
Portraying the research sector as in the patent-race literature, the amount of labour 
devoted to research is determined by the following arbitrage condition,
wt = XVt+i
where t indicates the indexing o f innovations and w  is the wage, which, due to full labour 
mobility, is equal for both research workers n  and production workers x. Furthermore, the 
value of an innovation Vt+i is determined by the following asset equation,
r Vt+i — 'Xt+i — Xrit+iVt+i 
where jrt+i indicates the profit flow of the t + 1  monopolist.
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Noting that production takes place in a perfectly competitive environment (contrast­
ing research), the t ih incumbent innovator will determine 7rt and x t by solving,
7Tt = max \pt (x t)x t -  w tx t\
X
where pt{xt) is the price at which the t th incumbent innovator can sell the flow x  o f the 
intermediate input to the final goods sector. The FOC is,
_ / _ c ?  y / ( ‘ - “ )
Xt \ w t/A t )
From the above one can determine the productivity adjusted wage cut — wt/A t as,
. _  ,77r(u;t+1)
Wt — A — ------r  +  Xnt+1
The model’s solution is characterised by the above equation, as well as the labour market 
clearing equation,
L = x t + n t
while, in the steady state, the average growth rate o f the economy is given by,
g =  An In 7
where n indicates the number o f research workers in the steady state.
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Chapter 4 
Optimal Patent Protection When Innovation is 
Sequential
4.1 Introduction
In recent years we have witnessed an increase in patent protection in the US. This increase 
has been manifested through the formation o f the Court o f Appeals of the Federal Circuit 
(Federal Courts Improvements Act) in 1982, the introduction o f the Patent and Trademark 
Laws Amendment (Bayh-Dole) in 1980, the increase in patent length form 17 to 20 years, 
and the introduction of patent protection for previously unpatentable works, such as soft­
ware and business methods. This increase is not restricted to the US and similar devel­
opments have been introduced worldwide through WIPO and TRIPS. It seems that strong 
patent protection is a modem day ‘mantra ’, which postulates that it offers greater incentives 
to innovators, increasing overall economic performance.
Various scholars have criticized the above view. For example, Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh (2000) find that despite the fact that firms are taking out many more patents, man­
agers do not perceive patents to be any more effective. This view coincides with evidence 
from Hall and Ziedonis (2001), who note that for technology sectors (such as microproces­
sors) where innovators are interlocked in using each other’s technology, patents act as a 
‘secondary defense ’ in protecting innovation and firms cross-license their patents to rival 
firms. Such critical views are not restricted to the empirical literature. From a theoretical
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perspective, O ’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) also cast doubt on the above view, 
noting that true as it may be that a patent rewards the present innovator, it nevertheless 
hinders all future re-innovation.
The importance of this issue is further highlighted by recent evidence from Lemer 
(2004), who in an international analysis of the relationship between patent strength and 
innovation, examines 177 policy shifts in 60 countries over 150 years and finds some sup­
port for an inverse U relationship. On the basis of the above, the aim o f this chapter is to 
examine whether patent protection promotes innovation and output growth.
While accounting for the view that patents reward the innovator, acting as stimuli, 
this chapter will also concentrate on two additional ways through which greater patent 
protection can affect innovation. The first one, similar to chapter 3, is based on the idea 
that the more one feels a competitor’s breath behind his back the more he is forced to run. 
The second way is channeled through knowledge spillovers. Specifically, an increase in 
patent protection will make it harder for other innovators to bypass a patent. Lemer (1995), 
working on biotechnology firms, finds that this difficulty may force some innovators to 
abstain from innovating in this particular sector. Such a reduction in innovative effort may 
lead to a drop in knowledge spillovers. Therefore, in a broad way, the model concentrates 
on the merits o f duplication, acknowledging that if  many innovators work on the same 
technology, even though some o f their work is mere duplication, they create knowledge 
spillovers that can potentially affect all innovators.
The argument o f this chapter will be substantiated through a static tournament model 
where many innovators race to create the greatest technology. The introduction of the tour­
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nament allows one to specifically model competition between innovators. In the second 
part of this chapter, in order to study the effect that patent protection has on output growth, 
this tournament model will be extended to include, similar to Loury (1979), a simple dy­
namic endogenous growth framework based on Aghion and Howitt (1992). It should be 
noted that the growth model is not essential to the chapter’s results. In fact, all the impor­
tant comparative statics will be proved within the static framework before I re-introduce 
them to the dynamic model. Nonetheless, the latter model allows one to concentrate on the 
following question, what is the optimal patent protection, the one that maximizes output 
growth? Accounting for the above, running a numerical simulation on the latter model I 
find that there is an inverse U relationship between patent protection and output growth.
The notion of patent protection used refers to patent breadth, where patent breadth 
will be defined as the re-innovation that is allowed to take place within the boundaries 
of legal protection. In addition, patent breadth will be a choice variable for the central 
planner, who is supposed to act on behalf o f the courts and the PTO, and whose objective is 
to maximize output growth. As section 4.3 explains, in broad terms the definition o f patent 
breadth suggested here is similar to Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1996). Overall, in 
broad terms, one can interpret patent breadth as either the number of patent claims the PTO 
allows for, or how strong the courts’ attitude towards infringement is. Hence, the model 
will not be discussing the time dimension of patents. This is due to the already extended 
discussion that this issue has received during the 90s, albeit in the context of models whose 
objective was to minimize the deadweight loss that is associated with patents; see Gallini 
(2002) for a literature review.
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The model is not without its drawbacks. For example, in order to clarify the analy­
sis, I have laboured under the assumption that there is no cross licensing, and I have limited 
any strategic interaction between the innovators, allowing it to be present only when tour­
naments become highly competitive. In addition, I have assumed that there is no cost 
attached to risk. In reality this is not true. However, as I argue, when a tournament be­
comes highly competitive innovators choose to follow high-risk strategies. Therefore, if 
there is an increasing cost attached on risk, when the tournament becomes more competi­
tive it will decrease the profits o f some participants leading them to abstain from taking part 
in the tournament. Such a decrease in the number o f innovators will decrease knowledge 
spillovers adversely affecting innovation. Overall, attaching an increasing cost on risk im­
poses on the model an additional effect on knowledge spillovers, one that is similar to the 
one that I have already described in a previous paragraph. Subsequently, in order to avoid 
any duplication and make the model tractable I abstain from attaching an increasing cost 
on risk
The outline o f this chapter is the following. Section 4.2 introduces the tournament 
and the way technology is generated. Section 4.3 displays the model’s main properties. 
Section 4.4 extents the model by introducing a simple growth framework, while section 4.5 
contains the simulation and it is followed by the conclusions.
4.2 Assumptions
In what follows this chapter will focus on industries such as biotechnology and pharma­
ceuticals. These are industries where patent protection is a successful way of protecting
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one’s innovation, and, accordingly, patents are essential to firms. In addition, these indus­
tries face a lot o f obsolescence, making the latest innovation by far the most important and 
useful one, both in production and as a base for further research.
I here frequently use the terms innovation, technology and neck and neck markets. To 
avoid confusion, I will provide a definition o f these terms. For the purpose o f this chapter, 
technology A  is the sum of many sequential individual innovations. Innovations, in turn, 
are defined as marketable technological advances, which are not obvious beforehand to 
someone skilled in the prior art. In this model, an innovation A A, will be the result of 
the winning innovator’s research between tournaments. As a neck and neck (for simplicity 
N-N) market/tournament, I define a market in which the technologies of the innovators 
are almost of identical magnitude. Therefore, a N-N market is a highly competitive one, 
because the innovators are positioned closely to each other.
Many heterogeneous potential-innovators participate in a series of tournaments in 
which all the participants have full information about each other. Hence there are no trade 
secrets and an innovator has no option but to patent his innovation in order to protect it 
from imitators.92 Innovators are assumed to be risk-neutral individuals, and their role is 
to form the idea that will become an innovation. In order to participate in tournament t 
(where t denotes the ordering o f periods and tournaments), innovators must incur a sunk 
cost C  which represents the cost o f building a laboratory and the effort to diffuse in one’s 
research the latest findings by universities etc. The objective of a tournament is to build a
92 In the absence o f trade secrets the innovator must patent his ideas even when he fails to win the tour­
nament. Otherwise, he will allow other innovators to free ride on his technology making it harder for him 
to win future tournaments, because he will have to compete with many other innovators who have the same 
technology.
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technology of the greatest possible magnitude. Hence, when a tournament ends, the winner 
will be the innovator who builds such a technology. Each tournament will lead to only one 
technology, which will be employed in the production of a consumption good.
The technological advances that the remaining innovators achieved during the tour­
nament will be treated as inventions. These inventions can be used as a base for one’s future 
research but they will not find any marketable application, unless the innovator succeeds in 
winning a tournament. If an innovator chooses not to take part in a tournament he stops his 
research.
In order to innovate the innovator needs to employ research workers n. These work­
ers, who are assumed to be homogeneous, will receive, similar to Jones (2001), a fixed 
percentage e of the revenues that the innovation generates. The remaining 1 — e will be the 
innovator’s payment. The revenues that an innovation A A t generates are irt . For simplic­
ity, I will assume that irt is a positive function o f A A t, and that n t depends positively on 
the expected revenues from A A t. In the first part o f this chapter I will not offer any micro­
economics structure backing these two assumptions. This will be included in the second 
part of the chapter.
If one was to introduce an endogenous labour market condition determining how 
profits are divided between the innovator and the n  research workers, this must be directly 
or indirectly affected by the model’s main variable o f interest, namely patent breadth. How­
ever, there seems to be (as far as I know) no empirical evidence connecting the labour 
market to patent breadth. An alternative assumption would be to allow (as Jones (2001) 
effectively does) the innovator to appropriate a greater part of profits as patent breadth in­
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creases. It should be stressed that working under such an assumption does not alter the 
chapter’s results and final formulas.
Innovators innovate sequentially.93 Assuming that no cross-licencing takes place, the 
innovation that the innovator builds in the course o f a tournament adds to the technology
t
that he had developed in the previous tournament,94 (i.e. A t =  ^  A A t), where patents are
o
assumed to last for two periods. If  there is no (or limited) patent protection innovators will 
manage to re-innovate around the winner’s patent (re-innovation implies the legal develop­
ment of an innovation with similar or identical capabilities). If there is patent protection, 
depending on how much re-innovating is allowed, the innovators will use either their own 
innovation, or the one that they built by re-innovating (whichever one is of larger magni­
tude). At the same time, since patents reveal how an innovation functions this information 
will spillover to all innovators.
For example, if  an innovator works on catalysts, any information included in all other 
innovators’ patents (who also work on catalysts), assists the innovator in his research effort. 
This could be because the innovator becomes aware o f the research path that the other 
innovators have followed and what type o f research should be avoided, or simply because 
the innovator has knowledge of what all the other innovators are currently working on. 
Nevertheless, this knowledge cannot be translated into an innovation because it is protected 
by a patent. Therefore, even though the innovator knows and understands the latest catalyst
93 There is a considerable literature which explores the time technology generation process in situations 
where the R&D investment o f the firm endogenously shapes technology. For a review see Baldwin and Scott 
(1987).
94 This assumption implies that the tournament will not be a memoryless race, unlike the tournament models 
of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Reinganum (1984).
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technology, he cannot use it without licence. If he wants to use it he must either pay 
royalties for a licence (this does not happen in this model because no cross-licencing is 
allowed), or attempt to re-innovate around the patent. This re-innovation will take place 
during the next tournament.
In the light of the above, (denoting the technology o f the winning innovator j ,  during 
tournament t as A tj  and his innovation as A A tj) ,  innovator i (a follower) will be able 
to advance his technology A tj  by m ax {A A tfi, A A A tj } ,  where A e  (0 ,1) indicates how 
much re-innovating around A A tj  innovator i can do.95 In this context, A can be considered 
as patent breadth. For example, if  A is close to zero then i cannot re-innovate around the 
innovation o f innovator j .  On the contrary, if  A is close to one then i can re-innovate 
around, which suggests that i will end up with an innovation that is of equal size to that of 
the winner. Accounting for the above, the technology o f innovator j  is,
A tj  = A t- i j  +  max {A AM, A A A tj }  (4.27)
In this framework, one way o f increasing tournament-based competition is to increase 
A, making it easier for the followers to re-innovate around the leader’s technology. This 
way, the followers will increase their technology getting closer to the leader. However, 
since A ^  1 and patent length is two periods long ceteris paribus an increase in A will not 
create a tournament where all innovators have identical technologies. Thus, the tournament 
is unlikely to become perfectly competitive. Henceforth, A will be considered a policy 
instrument used by the central planner.96
95 A cannot be one because in reality there exists tacit knowledge, which does not allow full re-innovation to 
take place. In addition, it is practically impossible to allow no re-innovation to take place. Therefore, A >  0.
96 In reality, even though (in the US) patent breadth is decided by the PTO, the courts and Congress, it is up
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The time-line of the model is the following. Competing innovators employ research 
workers and start their research while participating in a tournament. At the beginning of the 
tournament innovators make all the irreversible decisions regarding innovation, choosing 
what type of innovation path to follow. Production will take place immediately before the 
next tournament commences.
4.2.1 Technology
The purpose of this section is to study how technology is built. I will assume that any dis­
covery is the combined result o f four factors, prior art, luck, research workers and knowl­
edge spillovers. Prior art, in the form o f the already made technological discovery A 
is the building block on which one can base his research. Without prior art one must start 
from scratch. In addition to prior art, research workers n tj  must be used because they are 
the ones who create the innovation. In the absence o f the above inputs, the resulting inno­
vation will be dependent on luck and on the risk that the innovator is willing to employ in 
his research.
Furthermore, as Segerstrom (1998) argues, the more advanced (complicated) tech­
nology is the harder it is to innovate. Therefore, prior art can also affect innovation in a 
negative way. However, as Panagopoulos (2003) notes, an increase in knowledge spillovers 
stj  increases the innovator’s ability to cope with complicated prior art, where in this frame­
work stj  express the collective experience that all the tournament participants (absent j ) 
generate by patenting their innovations. Subsequently, the greater the knowledge spillovers
to the firm to seek litigation if  it finds out that rivals have used its technology.
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that an innovator manages to attain the less the difficulty that he will face during the inno­
vation process.
In what follows, I will introduce a technology generation function, which describes 
how technological discoveries A A are created. Specifically, every innovator j  uses the 
following technology generation function,
A Atj  =  /S.A\_l -n\- -------------- ^ +o't,jZt,j (4.28)
s t - i , j
c > o, <jtj  e  [o, l]
to develop a series o f innovations A Atj  that will allow him to create a technology and 
participate in the tournament. The initial condition for equation (4.28) is AA0 >  0. To 
avoid multiple winners in the first tournament, I will make the assumption that only one 
innovator has the initial idea to generate AAo.
In equation (4.28), / \ A \ _ l -n\ - expresses an innovation as the combined result of 
prior art A ^ _ i  ? and research workers n t 7. In addition, cAAt-hj describes the increase in 
difficulty that an innovator faces when he tries to create increasingly larger innovations.
Lastly, ztjt  which is distributed with a mean 0, is a term that can produce irregular
steps o f magnitude a t)jZtj .  These steps can vary both upward and downward and are a 
priori unforeseen. Because o f that, ( ? t , jZ t , j  is used to represent luck. Moreover, since 
the greater a tj  is, the greater the possible range of 0 t , j Z t , j  becomes, one can use o tj  to 
represent how risky a project is.97 Since ( ? t j Z t , j  can attain negative values it is possible for
97 In general one should expect that research paths that involve greater risk, if successful, should lead to 
innovations o f greater magnitude (when compared with less risky research paths). For a discussion on the 
uncertainty surrounding innovation see, Rosenberg (1996).
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A A* ,■ to be less than zero.98 If this turns out to be true, it implies that research has followed 
the wrong path. In this case, the innovator will not make use o f A A tj . "  An example of 
a technology that did not generate the expected results, similar to chapter 3, would be the 
High Definition TV.
In equation (4.28), A A tj  is the result o f the latest prior art A A t- i j .  True as it may 
be that such an assumption accords well with the way research is carried out in industries 
such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (because o f the high obsolescence rate that they 
face), one can also provide an alternative/complementary intuition. Accordingly, bearing in 
mind that patents last for 2 periods, Af_2 must be common and well understood knowledge. 
Subsequently, considering that research workers are homogeneous, any research that uses 
A t_2 as a base for developing new knowledge should produce similar results among all 
innovators. Therefore, in addition to the A A tj  that is generated via A A t- i tj, through 
equation (4.28), one should expect innovators to create a common A A  based on A*_2.
To avoid any duplication, bearing in mind that luck does not depend on A,  it is only the 
latest increment A A tj  (the one produced through equation (4.28)) that is affected by luck. 
Accounting for the above, considering that the model will concentrate on the differences 
between the technologies created by the innovators, common terms will always cancel out 
allowing one to focus only on how the latest prior art effects the creation of an innovation.
In order for an innovator to win the tournament he must create a technology that 
is greater than the one created by all other innovators. Accordingly, I will endow each
98 By contrast, since z has a zero mean and AAt- i ti — max XAAt- i j } ,  where A e  (0,1), the
EAAtji that is given by equation (4.28) is always greater than zero.
99 Accounting for this negative innovation, one should rewrite equation (4.27) as, Atj  — A fi-ij+ m a x  {0, A  At,i, AA
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innovator j  with an expected probability E p tj  o f winning the tournament. I will allow 
Ept j  (Atj ,  A t,i) e  [0, 1], j , i  e  [1, vt -  j } to be a function o f the technology that j  is 
expected to create, as well as o f the technology that all other innovators i ^  j  are expected 
to create. In this context, one should expect that, > 0, <  0. The latter
inequalities imply that the greater one’s expected technology is the greater his chances 
of wining the tournament are. Moreover, the greater the expected technology of one’s 
competitors is, the lower his chances o f winning the tournament are. Furthermore, I will 
allow for all cross derivatives to be small enough to effectively be considered as zero.100
Intuitive as Eptj  (A tj ,  A tj)  may be it is always preferable to provide some mathe­
matical intuition and an exact mathematical function that backs such an assumption. As Ap­
pendix one shows, this can be done by working in continuous time, viewing equation (4.28) 
as an Ito’s stochastic differential equation. This being the case, using the Kolmogorov’s 
backward equation one can derive the probability that j  has o f creating a technology that 
is greater than i's. The main drawback o f this approach, even though it leads to similar re­
sults as the rest o f the chapter, is its increased mathematical difficulty, and its reliance on 
graphical interpretations.
4.2.2 Finding the number of tournament participants
In this section, the innovators’ motive to participate in the tournament is explored. Ac­
cordingly, I will try to determine which innovators find it profitable to enter the tournament 
(thus I will try to determine v). In order to find who enters, I will examine the innovator’s
100 Even though this assumption simplifies the results the model’s proofs will not change if  one allows the 
cross derivatives to be different than zero.
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value of entering the current tournament. In doing so, I will treat the decision to inno­
vate as an investment decision. In this case, the investment will have a limited horizon of 
one period and it must commence at the beginning o f the tournament. Thereby, in a fash­
ion similar to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), I will form the innovator’s expected option value 
function to investing.101 One should expect that only innovators who have a positive option 
value will decide to take part in the tournament. In this context, the expected option value 
of an innovator j  is,
FtJ =  (1 -  e) E p ttjTrttj -  C  (4.29)
In equation (4.29), Ftj  is the expected option value to the investment of innovator j  (the 
option value of entering the tournament), C  is the sunk cost o f entry and (1 — e) 7rtj  are 
the profits that the winner gets from employing his technology in the production of a con­
sumption good (thus (1 — e) E p tj n tj  are the expected revenues from the innovation).
Only innovators who have an Ft ,j >  o will take part in the tournament. Subsequently, 
since the greater E p tj  (Atj 9 A tii) is the higher (1 — e) E p tj7Ttj  is, innovators who have a 
higher probability o f winning the tournament are more likely to participate in the tourna­
ment, because for these innovators (1 — e) E p t j n tj  > C  and Ftj  > 0. The number vt of 
the innovators who have a positive Ftj  is o f interest, since it determines the magnitude of 
the knowledge spillovers stj;  increases in vt increase the st:j available to the innovators, 
leading to a greater A A tj .
101 See also, Grenadier (1996), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Lambrecht and Perraudin (1997).
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4.3 Some comparative statics based on patent breadth
In this section I will compare the effects that different types of tournaments can have on 
innovation. The main difference between tournaments will be on how close the innovators 
are positioned to each other. As I mentioned in section 4.2, one can vary the distance 
between innovators by changing the patent breadth A allowing innovators to re-innovate 
more. Thereby, the question that this section poses is the following, what impact will an 
increase in A have on innovation?
To this question the model indicates that patent breadth can affect innovation in three 
different ways. The first one indicates that an increase in tournament competition (caused 
by an increase in A) can be detrimental for innovation. Hence, a tournament where only 
one (or a few) innovators can win is preferable to a tournament in which all innovators 
have equal chances. Specifically, as A increases and innovators get closer (increasing A t^), 
the expected probability E p tj  {Atj ,  A tji) that innovator j  has o f winning the tournament is 
reduced, reducing the expected revenues from the innovation E p tjjETrtfj. Such a reduction 
in expected revenues should lead to a lower n tj  and a drop in A A tj .
The above argument describes how the leading innovator will respond as A increases. 
The second way that a change in A can affect innovation reverses the above result, exam­
ining how the followers will respond. The rationale behind this rests on the increase in 
knowledge spillovers that one should expect if  more innovators participate in the tourna­
ment. Specifically, noting that the tournament never becomes perfectly competitive (since 
A ^  1 and patent length is two periods long), any increase in A increases the technologies of 
the lagging innovators. Therefore, ceteris paribus, such an increase in technology should
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lead to an increase in the lagging innovators’ probability to win the tournament, making 
it profitable for more lagging innovators to enter the tournament, increasing knowledge 
spillovers, leading to a greater innovation.
Specifically, section 2.1 introduced for each innovator an expected probability o f suc­
cess Ept j  (Atj ,  Atj) .  This probability depends on his E A tj , as well as on the E A tj  o f 
all the other innovators. If an innovator has a greater E A t j  (compared to the other inno­
vators), he increases his expected probability of winning the tournament, while decreasing 
that of the other innovators. However, a drop in the expected probability of winning the 
tournament (caused by a decrease in A , which brings the innovators further apart) leads to 
a reduction in the Ftj ,  see equation (4.29), forcing some innovators to abstain from enter­
ing the tournament, reducing vt and lowering knowledge spillovers. Bearing in mind that 
A A tj  =  AA^_ltjn^j  — +  o'tjZtj,  if  s tj  decreases, there should be a decrease in
A A t+i j .  Flipping the argument, any increase in competition, which leads the followers to 
increase their E A tj,  should ceteris paribus increase the followers’ E p tj. A  greater Eptj  
implies an increase in the followers’ Ftj,  which suggest that more innovators will enter the 
tournament.
The last way through which A can affect innovation is channeled though risk a. 
Specifically, if the central planner is to increase A allowing many innovators to get close 
enough as to form a N-N tournament, these innovators will only have one option if  they 
want to win, namely to increase their risk. This is because in N-N tournaments innovators 
are positioned close enough to have a similar A t -1 and a similar probability o f winning. 
Therefore, an innovator cannot win based on his technology.
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In detail, innovators maximize expected profits (1 -  e) E p tj E i z t,j with respect to 
at j. Since they are not aware of future realization o f 2 they can only solve a static problem. 
Furthermore, z can only become evident once the tournament commences, while a  must 
be chosen at the beginning of the tournament. However, if  a tournament is a N-N one it 
is impossible for the winner to have a negative realization o f z, because he would find it 
impossible to win and his place would be taken by an innovator with a positive z. The only 
way possible to have a negative z  and still win is if  all the other contestants also have a 
negative z, but this should be ruled out in tournaments with many participants.
Accordingly, if one is to solve the above maximization problem, accounting for a pos­
itive 2, the FOC is given by the following equation, (1 — e) ^ Pt,; E7tLj +(1 -  e) E p tf dE7rhid o t ,j  V /  d o t j
d o hi .0. Using the implicit function theorem, the following relationship can be found, QEA 
-  g f / 2 dQa~f  • Bearing in mind that, < 0, -§§^~  must always be greater than zero.
This relationship implies that the closer any innovator i gets to innovator j  the greater the 
risk that innovatory must use. Thus, noting that A A tj  =  A A \_x +  VtjZtj
the greater a tj  is, the greater A A tj  will be.
This result, which shows that in N-N tournaments with many participants an increase 
in tournament competition will lead innovators to take more risk, increasing the magnitude 
of A A,  is equivalent to that o f Beath Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989), who note that the 
more one feels a competitors’s breath behind his back the more he is forced to run. It 
also establishes that risk can be an endogenous choice variable, adding to the findings of 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Klette and de Meza (1986), who found that patent races 
yield excessive risky technologies.
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4.4 Introducing a growth framework
In this section I will introduce the main aspects o f the growth model, which is broadly 
based on Aghion and Howitt (1992). Unless otherwise stated all the assumptions included 
in the first part of the chapter continue to apply. Specifically, there are three classes of 
tradable objects. The first one is labour, the second one is a non-storable consumption good 
and the third one is an intermediate good. In addition, there is a continuum of infinitely- 
lived individuals, with identical intertemporal additive preferences, which are defined over 
lifetime consumption and a constant rate o f time preference.
Assuming no disutility from supplying labour, there are three categories o f labour. 
The first one is unskilled workers x. These workers are all equipped with one unit o f labour 
and are used for producing an intermediate input, which will be employed in the production 
of the consumption good. Similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992), unskilled workers can also 
function as firms whose aim is to produce the consumption good. The second category 
is skilled workers in the form o f research workers n. Both skilled and unskilled workers 
are homogeneous, operate in an environment of perfect labour mobility and can exchange 
roles. In order to avoid confusion, I will assume that research workers will not be used 
for production if they have already been used in developing the winning innovation.102 
Furthermore, for simplicity, assuming no population growth, the total number of research 
workers n  and production workers x  is equal to L > 1, i.e.,
L  =  x t + n t (4.30)
102 One can assume that there exist unions that forbid such practices.
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The third category of labour is innovators, the number of innovators who decide to 
take part in a tournament is 1 <  vt < L; thus j  e  [1, L). Contrary to production workers 
and research workers innovators are heterogeneous. Innovators are assumed to be risk- 
neutral individuals and their role is to form the idea that will become an innovation, where 
each innovation consists of the invention o f a new intermediate good, whose use as an input 
allows more efficient methods to be used in producing the consumption good. Innovators 
employ research workers and create an innovation using equation (4.28). However, as Jones 
(1998) notes, for this class o f models growth stops being endogenous unless technology 
exhibits increasing returns to scale. Subsequently, in a fashion similar to Romer (1990),
C +  ? > 1 .
Since no credit market is supposed to exist, all non-research workers consume their 
wage at each instant and research workers receive no payment unless they win the tourna­
ment, in which case they are paid a fixed percentage e o f the revenues from the innovation 
that they have created. The remaining revenues will be transferred to the innovator. If an 
innovator fails to win a tournament, since the research workers that he used will receive no 
salary, they have no option but to be employed in production.
Similar to the benchmark model, the consumption good is produced in a perfectly 
competitive market by a firm that licenses the patent from the innovator, using an interme­
diate good x t with productivity A A t, in the following fashion,
yt =  A A * x bt , {a,  b} > 0 (4.31)
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In equation (4.31), yt represents the output produced using the innovation o f the tourna­
ment’s winner j .  Since, no matter who wins the tournament, there is only one type of 
consumption good, I will abstain from attaching a subscript to yt.
The time-line of the model is the following. Competitors employ research workers 
and start their research while participating in a tournament. At the beginning of the tour­
nament innovators make all the irreversible decisions regarding innovation, choosing what 
type of innovation path to follow and how many research workers to employ. After the 
tournament they license their innovation to a production firm. Production will take place 
immediately before the next tournament commences.
4.4.1 Solving the model
In this section I will solve the model. Specifically, the research workers n tj  that innovator 
j  employs receive a payment w tj  that is equal to an e percentage o f the expected revenues 
from the innovation that they expect to create. If  they fail to win they will receive no pay­
ment. Therefore, the wage that research workers receive can be found from the following 
relationship,
eEnt
w tJ = E p t j  ^ (4.32)
Since the consumption good is produced in a perfectly competitive market, similar to 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), the profits from the sale o f the consumption good 7Ttj  are,
7r( j  =  b AAf j Xbt j  -  w tj x t j (4.33)
4.4 Introducing a growth framework 132
where wt,jXtj  expresses the wage that the production workers will receive. Substituting 
equation (4.33) in equation (4.32) one can derive the expected wage E w tj  as,
The innovator maximizes its expected revenues with respect to the research workers 
that he intends to use, accounting for equation (4.28). The maximization problem that each 
innovator solves is,
where A A  is used as a state variable. In equation (4.35), the time horizon is between t 
and oo because the innovator may win more than one tournaments. Through the above 
problem the innovator maximizes his expected profits accounting explicitly for all the re­
innovation that will take place at time t. This is because E p tj  {Atj ,  A t^) accounts for the 
technologies of all the other i ^  j  innovators, including the technologies that they develop 
by re-innovating. Furthermore, he also implicitly accounts for all future innovations that 
will be based (due to re-innovation) on his technology. This line o f thinking suggests that 
the innovators accounts for both lagging and leading breadth.
In the steady state (where n t+i^ =  n tji = n ) all innovators are expected to develop 
innovations of non-changing magnitude A A  Thereby, the distance between innovators is 
not expected to fluctuate. Subsequently, if  A does not change, the ratio Pt = - ABid.. should
OO
m ax (4.35)
s.t. E A A
A.4o >  0
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be equal to one. In total, the expected n  is given by the following FOC,
In what follows I will display that the comparative statics of section 3 still apply. 
In detail, the first way through which A can affect innovation indicates that an increase in 
tournament competition (caused by an increase in A) can be detrimental for innovation. 
Specifically, as A increases and innovators get closer (increasing A tfi), the expected prob­
ability that innovator j  has of winning the tournament is reduced, reducing Ptj  =  •
However, equation (4.36) suggests that in the steady state, if  £ <  1, any increase in A, 
which decreases P,  should lower n, negatively affecting innovation. Furthermore, the sec­
ond way that a change in A can affect innovation reverses the above result, examining how 
the followers will respond. This result is not based on the assumptions o f the growth model. 
Thus, its intuition is identical to the one o f section 3.
The third way through which A affects A A,  similar to section 3, concentrates on the 
increase in risk that innovators are forced to adopt when the tournament becomes N-N with 
many participants. Specifically, innovators maximize expected profits (1 — e) E p t,j^t,j 
with respect to a t,j- Since they are not aware o f future realization o f z they can only 
solve a static problem. Following the same reasoning as in section 3, if  one is to solve this 
maximization problem, using equations (4.34)-(4.33), accounting for a positive z, the FOC 
is given by the following equation, 0 =  dQPti  . Using the implicit function the-
^  f »j  ^  U  j  P  f  j j  ^  ^  i j
orem, the following relationship can be found, ~  Bearing in mind
that, < 0, must always be greater than zero. The above intuition suggests that
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in N-N tournaments with many participants an increase in tournament competition will lead 
innovators to take more risk, increasing the magnitude of A A
4.5 The link between patent breadth and growth
Bearing in mind that the previous sections have indicated a possible non-monotonic rela­
tionship between patent breadth and innovation (production), this section examines if  this 
non-monotonic relationship exists in the context o f this model. Noting that I lack a data 
set that would allow me to calibrate the model, or even an exact function for knowledge 
spillovers and E p tj  (A tj , A tji), it is best to view this section as a numerical exercise, run 
for educational purposes. Subsequently, all the values/functions that I will be using during 
this experiment are ad hoc, even though they accord to what the literature has been using in 
similar cases. Nevertheless, when in doubt (such as with e), I experimented with a whole 
range o f values. Accordingly, in this section I will try and find the optimal patent breadth, 
the one that maximizes the economy’s output growth rate. If such an optimal patent breadth 
exists, then there must be some form of concavity between output growth rate and patent 
breath.
With the above in mind, in order to account for the joint effects of A on the economy’s 
output growth rate I run a numerical experiment over a series o f tournaments, gradually 
increasing the degree of technological competition by increasing the value of A in each 
consecutive tournament. It should be noted that in order to avoid any unexpected effects 
caused by the randomness o f z, each tournament consisted o f 20 periods during which A
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remained steady. It is the mean rate of output growth from these 20 periods that I used as 
the output growth rate o f each individual tournament.
Specifically, for each of the 20 periods (denoted by t) within a tournament I nu­
merically solved the problem of equation (4.35) and run equations (4.28)-(4.30), (4.33)- 
(4.34) for 100 heterogenous innovators. Throughout this numerical experiment the tech­
nology o f innovator i was equal to the ratio o f where j  is the winner o f period t. 
Furthermore, I allowed the probability function to be equal to, E p tj  ( A tj ,  A tii) = 1 — 
0.5 exp ( E A tti — E A tj ) ,  which accords well to the assumptions made about E p tj  (A tj , A tyi), 
where the 0.5 was included just in case the two innovators had identical technologies. As 
an alternative, I used the probability function derived in Appendix one.
In the first period o f each tournament a starting technology, randomly distributed 
(using a Normal distribution) in the interval [1,5], was assigned to each innovator. This 
technology did not change between tournaments. Therefore, at the first period of each 
tournament all innovators had the same starting value as in the past one. This intuition 
implies that some innovators had a starting technology that was close to 1 and some close 
to 5. In the same fashion, each innovator had a different z, randomly distributed (using a 
Normal distribution) in the interval [—5,5], which varied with each period. The starting 
value o f o  was zero, because the starting tournament was not supposed to be a highly 
competitive tournament. However, with each tournament a  gradually increases until it 
becomes equal to 1 in the last tournament.
V t - j
With respect to spillovers, I used the following functional form, s t j  =  E  l A A t,i,
i
which treats knowledge spillovers as a weighted sum of the innovations created by all
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innovators except j .  In the latter equation, 7 i >  0 indicates the weight with which the tech­
nology of each innovator entered the spillover’s function, where, similar to Hall Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2000), not all innovations find equal use in generating knowledge spillovers. 
Subsequently, similar to Panagopoulos (2003), I allowed the innovators who were close to 
the top o f the quality ladder to generate more knowledge spillovers compared to the ones 
that are further down. Following this type o f reasoning, in this numerical experiment 7* was 
equal to the inverse of innovator i ’s ranking. Thus, the 50th innovator had a 7 - =  1/50.
Bearing in mind that in this model the innovator and the research workers share the 
profits, I allowed the innovator to have an e =  40% share o f the profits. Noting that the role 
o f the innovator in this framework was very similar to the one in reality played by a venture 
capitalist, an e =  40% accords with the average percentage o f firm stock that venture 
capitalists get by providing firms with capital and expertise. For b I used the share of 
labour in US production which is 0.33 and for a  the share o f capital, which is 0.7.103 Since, 
production workers and research workers are homogeneous and employ similar production 
functions (the production function for the intermediate input uses A A  and x  in a fashion 
similar to the way equation (4.28) employs A  A  and n) I used £ =  0.7 and £ =  0.33. 
Finally, L  was 100, while in accordance with the recent NSF data (suggesting that research 
workers are less that 1% percent of the US working population), the starting values for x  
and n were 99 and 1 respectively.
On par with Lemer (2004), who examines 150 years o f patent protection, this nu­
merical experiment was repeated for 150 tournaments. In these tournaments A started from
103 These numbers are taken from Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
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being zero in the first tournament and become one in the 150th tournament. Hence, each 
tournament become more competitive. The number o f participants was derived from equa­
tion (4.29), where C  was arbitrarily chosen as 70% of the winner’s expected revenues from 
the innovation. Thus, in order for an innovator to find it profitable to participate in the tour­
nament his expected revenues must be equal to at least seventy percent o f the winner’s. If 
one is to increase C  then it becomes harder to take part in the tournament, while any de­
crease in C  makes it easier. Bearing the above in mind, in the first tournaments, where 
innovators had starting technologies that were positioned far apart, only a few had an F  
that fulfilled this requirement, while as the tournament became more competitive, more 
innovators fulfilled equation (4.29).
Running a numerical experiment for (5=10,  which suggests that the 100 competitors 
were initially positioned far from each other, the humped shaped relationship of figure 
4.3 was derived. Ad hoc as the above assumptions may be, this shape does not change 
drastically if one is to alter e (in the range o f 15% — 60%, which is the usual share of profits 
a venture capitalist gets), S (for values between 5 and 20, which allow for some observable 
heterogeneity among innovators), C  (for values that do not make it either impossible or too 
easy to participate, i.e. between 40% and 90%), or if  one is to use the alternative probability 
function. What changes is the turning point and the steepness o f the curve.
4.6 Conclusions
Recent findings by Lemer (2004) point to a non-linear relationship between patent strength 
and innovation. The aim o f this chapter was to offer a theoretical explanation for this non-
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linear relationship. The model is built upon a patent race in which many heterogeneous 
innovators participate. In this model, innovation is sequential. Hence, current innovation 
builds on past technology creating current technology. Therefore, the tournament’s win­
ner is in a better position to win the future tournament, since he has the more advanced 
technology. However, depending on the level of patent protection, the other innovators can 
re-innovate around the winner’s patent and create an innovation o f similar magnitude. Sub­
sequently, if  patent protection is weak the innovators who failed to win the tournament will 
manage to re-innovate around the winner’s patent and position themselves close to the win­
ner’s technology. The closer they get the more tournament competition increases, because 
all innovators start the tournament from similar starting points.
As the model shows, even though higher patent protection increases the innovator’s 
incentives to innovate it leads to less tournament competition. However, highly competitive 
tournaments, such as neck and neck ones, lead to greater innovations because innovators 
are forced to use high-risk innovation strategies. Such strategies can potentially lead to 
great discoveries. Furthermore, compared to non competitive tournaments, in a compet­
itive tournament more innovators will find it profitable to enter the tournament, because 
innovators have comparable technologies and comparable chances of winning the tourna­
ment. The more the innovators who enter the tournament the more the available knowledge 
spillovers and the greater the resulting innovation.
In a nutshell, an increase in patent protection increases the incentives to innovate, but 
also leads to less knowledge spillovers and less risky research strategies. Simulating the 
model, the above are combined in an inverted U relationship between patent protection and
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growth. For future research, one could run a more detailed simulation calibrated using US- 
EU data. This would be interesting on account o f the considerable increase in US patent 
protection in the 1980s and the current EU debate on following the US example. As the 
model suggests, it is important to know on what side o f the curve the economy is before 
increasing (or decreasing) patent protection.
4.A Appendix one
Working in continuous time, without loss o f generality equation (4.28) can be expressed 
as, dAj (t ) = s ( t )A  (t)^ rfijdt +  a (A)j dz (t)-. As Malliaris and Brock (1987, ch. 2, pg. 
101, theorem 7.6) note, the probability density function cp o f the innovator’s technology 
can be written, using the Kolmogorov’s backward equation as, ~~ SjA^ jn]<^Aj ~
^  =  0. Assuming that the distribution o f A  does not change, making the density func­
tion (p time invariant, the above differential equation will give the following solution, 
<p =  cexp f — — 1 j ,  where c is a constant. Based on the latter equation, innovator 
j ’s expected probability o f innovating to a technology level that is between some minimum 
technology level A 0 and the upper technology limit A,  is given by, E p  (A  > E A j  > A0) =
"p ( 2sEA^ln^  \  -
c J exp I — ^ — L I dA and it should be equal to 1; since Aj e  (A0, A]. Thereby one
A 0 \  3 J
can express innovator j ’s expected probability of innovating to a technology level A j  that 
even though it is greater than A 0 it is less than the expected technology level created by 
innovator i as, E p  (E A { >  E A j  >  A 0) = c f  exp I 4 I dA. Moreover, since
Ao V aj J
E p  (A > E A j  >  Ao) = E p  { A  > E A j  >  E A j )  + E p  ( E A j  >  E A j  >  A q), the expected
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probability that innovator j  has of over passing innovator i is given by,
Epj Ep  (A > E A j  >  Aq) — E p  ( E A i  >  E A j  > Aq)
E A i
=  1 — c
=  1 -
Ao 
—f o 
CUJ a 3
exp
/  2 s E A (]+ l n\
dA
2 s E A < j  L
( 2  s E A ^ n f  
exp - 3 exp
Z2sA |^n|'
V
It should be noted, that the main drawback o f this approach, even though it leads to 
similar results as the rest o f the chapter, is its increased mathematical difficulty (stemming 
from the use o f continuous time), and its reliance on graphical interpretations.
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Fig. 5.3. The X  axis represents A over 150 tournaments. In the first tournament A is zero, while in the last one A is 
one.
